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That intellectual property rights are "strictly territorial"1 once
seemed a relatively straightforward idea. Unlicensed sale of patented
products in both Germany and the United Kingdom gave rise to
distinct causes of action in German and English courts.2  Canadian
trademark law governed distribution of trademarked products in
Canada, even where infringement litigation was initiated in a US
court by a US plaintiff.3 Infringement of an architectural copyright by
unauthorized construction of a building in Rotterdam implicated
Dutch copyright law, even where plaintiff and defendant were Eng-
lish residents and the original plans were drawn in London.4 World-
wide distribution of a videocassette that reproduced a musical work
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1. Abkco Music & Records, Inc., v. Music Collection Int'l Ltd. [1995] R.P.C. 657, 660
(Hoffmann, L.J.).
2. Plastus Kreativ AB v. Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co., [1995] R.P.C. 438, 446 (holding that
English Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over infringement of German and
French patents).
3. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that
Canadian trademark law, not the Lanham Act, applies to infringement of trademark rights in
Canada).
4. Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (C.A.). The jurisdictional issues in
Pearce were adjudicated under the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1978 O.J. (L) 304 [hereinafter
Brussels Convention]. However, the opinion was fully reasoned on the common law principles
applying to the issue of jurisdiction.
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without a license might implicate the copyright laws of all of the
countries in which the videocassette was distributed. 5
As many commentators have pointed out, the territoriality of in-
tellectual property laws is not as straightforward in the "internation-
ally networked" environment. 6 When a party resident in Country A
loads a copyrighted work, a trademark, the data comprising a trade
secret, or the code underlying a business method patent onto a web-
site in Country B without an appropriate license, and the website is
accessible to web surfers all over the world, localization of legally
cognizable infringements of intellectual property rights is fraught with
problems.7 And where a multiplicity of potential laws might apply,
the territoriality principle comes under considerable pressure to
adapt.8 Though the "upward harmonization 9 agenda in the public
international law of intellectual property may theoretically be consis-
tent with the territoriality premise,10 one effect of the development
and promotion of standardized international norms1 and their adop-
5. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998)
(noting that court should apply the copyright laws of at least eighteen foreign countries in a
dispute over a videocassette distributed in as many countries).
6. See, e.g., Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Property in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAW 99, 103 (1995) [hereinafter Geller, TRIPS Dispute
Settlement]; Paul Edward Geller, The Universal Electronic Archive: Issues in International
Copyright, 25 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 54 (1994) [hereinafter Geller,
Universal Electronic Archive]; Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright:
Territoriality and Authors' Rights in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Cyberian Captivity]; Raymond T. Nimmer,
Licensing on the Global Information Infrastructure: Disharmony in Cyberspace, 16 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 224 (1995).
7. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 563, 570-71 (2000) (discussing difficulty of localizing causes of action arising
from Internet conduct); Geller, TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 6, at 101-03 (discussing
difficulty of localizing intellectual property infringements).
8. See, e.g., Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on
Global Networks, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 799, 808 (1998) (noting that, based on a territorial
perspective of transnational infringement, a "multiplicity" of foreign laws would apply to an
infringing work that could be accessed in various jurisdictions).
9. See generally Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties:
Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the
Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 461 (1998) (discussing the "upward
harmonization" agenda in international intellectual property relations).
10. Curtis A. Bradley, US Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 549 (1997) (suggesting that the perceived need for uniformity between
domestic intellectual property regimes arises because of the principle that domestic intellectual
property laws do not have extraterritorial effect).
11. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex
IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENT- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
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tion into domestic intellectual property law systems will inevitably be
the diminishment in the role of domestic policy choices in the intellec-
tual property law field. As a result, the traditional image of intellec-
tual property laws as providing bundles of national, territorially
confined rights may be becoming increasingly misleading.'
In the light of these developments, does the territoriality princi-
ple have any continued viability? Some commentators are doubtful,
suggesting that the territoriality principle is now difficult to accom-
modate with the internationalization of intellectual property in the
global environment. 3 The contested character of the territoriality
premise is of course an aspect of a broader set of issues arising out of
the unbundling of the exclusive territoriality associated with the
nation state in the globalized economy.14 In the intellectual property
context, this point has perhaps been put at its highest by leading
English intellectual property jurist Sir Robin Jacob. Extrapolating
from the European experience, Sir Robin prophesizes that "[a]s time
goes on,... the world will realize that at least for intellectual property
the days of the nation-state are over."'15 There are certainly important
[hereinafter TRIPs]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Sept. 28, 1979,
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm [hereinafter Paris Convention];
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Sept. 28, 1979;
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, June 27, 1989, 3 B.T.S. 1997; World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty]; World Intellectual
Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76;
World Intellectual Property Organization Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1047;
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the
Legal Protection of Databases, O.J. (L 77/20) [hereinafter Database Directive]; First Council
Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1; Council Directive 87/54/EEC of 16 December 1986
on the Legal Protection of Topographies of Semiconductor Products, 1987 O.J. (L 24) 36;
Council Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in
Particular, Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178); International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Mar. 19, 1991, available at
http://www.upov.int/eng/convntns/1991/pdf/act1991 .pdf.
12. See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" of National Copyright
Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 266 (2000) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, International Copyright].
13. See Ginsburg, Cyberian Captivity, supra note 6, at 348-49 (questioning whether, in the
copyright context, the globalization of methods of production and dissemination of copyright
works means that copyright laws should or can remain tethered to the principle of territoriality);
Geller, Universal Electronic Archive, supra note 6, at 55-56 (arguing that it is no longer
appropriate to localize either works or their infringement within particular territories).
14. See, e.g., Saskia Sassen, Toward a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7, 9 (1996); Daniel W. Drezner, On the Balance Between International
Law and Democratic Sovereignty, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 321, 332-34 (2001) (discussing the role of
the United States in challenges to domestic sovereignty of other nations).
15. Hon. Mr. Justice Jacob, International Intellectual Property Litigation in the Next
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claims to be made for the efficiency gains that might follow from
achieving standardized, supranational intellectual property laws.16 In
some contexts, particularly for copyright law, efficiency gains may
lead to more productive licensing of protected material: 17 a strong
case can be made that efficient, frictionless dissemination of copyright
works is consistent with the promotion of the progress of knowledge. 8
Notwithstanding projections such as this, it would be inappropri-
ate, I believe, to assume (or even hope) that we are partway through
a grand narrative that has the demise of territoriality and the
achievement of standardized, supranational intellectual property laws
as its inevitable dfnouement.19 As I have suggested elsewhere, the
benefits of supranational standards need to be balanced against the
claims that can be made for the ability of domestic nations to do some
things differently in the intellectual property context, as their individ-
ual circumstances might require.20 At the same time, assertions of
Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 507, 516 (2000).
16. These are most likely to be relevant when determining the law relating to ownership
and transfer. For detailed analysis of this question in the copyright context, see Jane C.
Ginsburg, The Private International Law of Copyright in an Era of Technological Change, in 273
RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 363-74 (Hague Acad. of Int'l Law ed., 1998).
17. See generally Nimmer, supra note 6. Not all aspects of copyright's purposes are
necessarily served by policies that promote frictionless licensing of copyright works. For
instance, some of the author-focused rights associated with moral rights systems, such as the
right to maintain the integrity of a work following transfer of economic rights, may "clog" the
dissemination of copyright works in particular formats to which authors might object. See
Andrd Franqon, Protection of Artists' Moral Rights and the Internet, in PERSPECTIVES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES 75 (Frfddric Pollaud-Dulian ed., 1999).
18. The classic statement on economic efficiency justifications for intellectual property
systems is Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977). This thesis has been developed in the copyright context by a number of authors. See,
e.g., Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don't Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright's
New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899
(1995). These theories are fully discussed (and rigorously critiqued) in a recent work by
Professor Cohen: Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998).
19. Professor Chen uses the metaphor of "evolution" to describe the progress of
globalization. See Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157
(2000); Jim Chen, Epiphytic Economics and the Politics of Place, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1
(2001).
20. Graeme W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright
Infringement in Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575 (2000). Here, I am not questioning at the
macro level the desirability of convergence of domestic intellectual property laws within the
quasi-federal system of the European Union. For scholarship taking that approach, see
generally Larry CatA Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and
the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 193-208 (2001). Leading English jurist Sir Hugh
Laddie has recently described in detail the conflict between national systems of intellectual
property rights and the policy of free movement of goods within the Economic Community, the
latter being one of the key purposes of the Treaty of Rome, Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Sir Hugh Laddie, National IP. Rights: A
Moribund Anachronism in a Federal Europe?, 23 E.I.P.R. 402 (2001). Numerous directives and
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domestic self-determination cannot be allowed to thwart the devel-
opment of international norms, particularly where the viability of
domestic intellectual property systems depends, at least to some
extent, on the networks of reciprocal obligations that the interna-
tional system provides.2' As a descriptive matter, the principle of
territoriality continues to shape commercial decision making, gov-
ernmental policy agenda, and doctrinal development. 22 In addition, a
variety of normative claims in support of the continued relevance of
territoriality can be based on ideas such as international comity,23 the
contestable propriety of unilateralist approaches to choice of law,24
democratic accountability,25 and the importance of intellectual prop-
erty to domestic economies.26
This Article explores claims that may be made for the continued
viability of the territoriality principle that derive from concerns about
the importance of domestic self-determination in domestic intellec-
decisions of the European Court of Justice are consistent with the principle that the free
movement of goods takes priority as a matter of European policy over domestic control of
intellectual property rights. Id. The text of Forth Recital of the EC Database Directive reflects
this theme: "Whereas copyright protection for databases exists in varying forms in the Member
States according to legislation or case-law, and whereas, if difference in legislation in the scope
and conditions of protection remain between the Member States, such unharmonized
intellectual property rights can have the effect of preventing the free movement of goods or
services within the Community." Database Directive, supra note 11. Harmonization of
intellectual property laws within the EU, where the EU institutions facilitate and govern the
choice of European nations to achieve convergence in diverse legal, political, economic, and
social fields, raises issues that are qualitatively very different from those arising in contexts in
which these pre-existing political structures do not exist.
21. See generally Part II.C., infra; see also Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause
Mandate Isolationism?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Austin,
Isolationism].
22. Among the clearest indications of this in the Anglo-American context is the private
international law jurisprudence emerging in English courts, from which it is clear that courts
remain committed to the view that intellectual property rights are strictly territorial. See, e.g.,
Abkco Music & Records, Inc. v. Music Collection Int'l Ltd. [1995] R.P.C. 657; Plastus Kreativ
AB v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., [1995] R.P.C. 438; Chiron Corp. v. Organon Teknika Ltd.,
[1995] F.S.R. 325.
23. Bradley, supra note 10, at 513, 515.
24. See generally Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The
Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of
Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297 (1996); David J.
Santeusanio, Extraterritoriality and Secondary Boycotts: A Critical and Legal Analysis of United
States Foreign Policy, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 367, 373-74 (1998).
25. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise of Law on the Global Network, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 3, 5-6 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997). This point is
explored at length in Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Rights, a report
of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, London, September 2002, available at
http//:www.iprcommission.org [hereinafter Integrating Intellectual Property Rights].
26. Professor Aoki has written some of the most compelling recent work in this area. See
Aoki, supra note 9.
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tual property laws. 7 Here, "domestic self-determination" refers to
the ability of individual nations to craft intellectual property laws to
suit their own circumstances, circumstances that include both their
domestic situations and their relationships with other nations. The
concept of domestic self-determination is meant to capture the ability
of individual nations to develop and test new intellectual property
policies; it might also include the ability to calibrate the level and
types of protection afforded to intellectual property proprietors in
light of a nation's specific circumstances, to craft new defenses and
exemptions and expand existing ones, and to use intellectual property
laws as vehicles for molding cultural and technical policies to suit
domestic circumstances.
The processes and politics of globalization have distilled con-
cerns about the inability of individual nations to pursue policies that
suit their domestic circumstances in a wide variety of contexts, in-
cluding labor relations, environmental policies and human rights,
concerns that have sometimes provoked expressions of considerable
rage.28 The compromised ability of individual nations to control
intellectual property policies, following the linking of these policies to
27. Many commentators have addressed the broader question of the continued viability of
the concept of domestic sovereignty in the era of globalization. See, e.g., Drezner, supra note
14. Some recognition of the principle of domestic self-determination is reflected in the
Preamble to TRIPs, which provides, inter alia, "Recognizing the underlying public policy
objectives of a national system for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives." TRIPs, supra note 11. The Preamble also
provides: "Recognizing... the need for new rules and disciplines concerning: ... (c) the
provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual
property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems." Id. (second emphasis
added). It may be, however, that this part of the Preamble refers to the General Obligations as
to Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Part III of TRIPs. Article 41.5 of TRIPs
recognizes that different nations might have different resources available to enforce
infringements of intellectual property rights:
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a judicial
system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the
enforcement of laws in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce
their laws in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and
the enforcement of laws in general.
Id.
28. These have included often quite violent street protests. See Alan Friedman, Violence
Rages at G-8 Talks, Protester Is Killed in Genoa; Leaders Upbeat on Economy, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., July 21, 2001, at 1 (discussing the violent protests at the July 2001 meetings of the "Group
of Eight" leaders in Genoa); Ian Black & Michael White, Sweden Asks: Who Set Off Riots?:
'Thuggery' of Protests Against EU-US Talks Condemned, GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 16,2001,
Foreign Pages, at 13 (discussing protests at June 2001 EU Trade Summit at Gothenburg); Kevin
Danaher, Power to the People, OBSERVER, April 29, 2001, News Pages, at 25 (discussing various
protests against "globalization" and the free trade movement, including the 1999 meetings of
the WTO at Seattle).
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the world trade regime, has become another focus for these con-
cerns. 29 The protests that now surround the political and legal proc-
esses of globalization raise critically important questions; however, in
this Article, I do not seek to add to attacks on the international intel-
lectual property law edifice.30 For now, it seems that the reality 3' of
international intellectual property law is upon us, a reality that may in
many instances serve interests and agenda pursued purely within
domestic contexts.32 Accordingly, I do not intend to engage with the
important debates that surround the issue of the survival of domestic
sovereignty in the intellectual property law context, either as a de-
scriptive or normative matter, in a globalized world. Indeed, else-
where I have argued that neglect of the international intellectual
property system in the development of domestic doctrine may itself
be problematic. 33 Adopting an evolutionary approach over a revolu-
tionary one, this Article seeks to find scope for expression of the
values associated with domestic self-determination in the interna-
tional intellectual property law regime that is currently emerging. It
thus posits the value of domestic self-determination as something that
might influence the processes of forging international intellectual
property jurisprudence, rather than seeking to engage with those
processes head-on.
29. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO (2001).
30. For compelling critiques of the globalization of intellectual property, including the
deleterious effects of TRIPs on domestic economies and broader welfare interests of particular
nations, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS 34 (1996) (referring to
intellectual property ownership as the equivalent of an "intellectual land grab"); VANDANA
SHIVA, BIOPIRACY (1997); Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR.
L. REV. 237, 245-47 (1996) (describing the harmonization of global intellectual property laws as
"inequitable"); Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117 (1999) (arguing that harmonized international intellectual
property law is not likely to produce net welfare gains for the United States or internationally);
see also KLEIN, supra note 29. These and other commentators have suggested that the
imposition of foreign intellectual property norms on domestic law has caused and will in the
future impose considerable hardship on particular nations. See, e.g., Henry M. Charkava,
International Copyright and Africa: The Unequal Exchange, in COPYRIGHT AND
DEVELOPMENT: INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 13-34 (Philip G. Altbach ed., 1995);
Samuel A. Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or
Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831.
31. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms
in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 734 (2001) ("International copyright
law is suddenly very real.").
32. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integration of International and Domestic
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 307 (2000).
33. See Austin, Isolationism, supra note 21.
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Professor Dinwoodie's recent scholarship 34 has drawn attention
to the important task ahead of identifying and developing policies and
values that will assist in the shaping of international intellectual
property jurisprudence. As we engage with this task, it is important
that the territoriality principle-and the possibilities for domestic self-
determination it allows-should not come to be regarded as an
irritating distraction in the seemingly inexorable drive toward uni-
form international standards. Rather, I suggest that valuing domestic
self-determination might contribute to the formulation of interna-
tional intellectual property jurisprudence in the various contexts in
which this process occurs: both doctrinally, in the forging of public
and private international law, and institutionally, as we come to think
about which institutions might be involved in that process. Just as
efficiency is an important policy aim informing this process, so too, it
is suggested, is the ability of individual nations to develop intellectual
property laws in accordance with domestic needs. However, in the
current environment, there is a risk that we may lose sight of the
importance of domestic self-determination as the upward harmoniza-
tion agenda continues to gain momentum.35
Part I of this Article examines the role of territoriality in public
and private international intellectual property law, and suggests that
these bodies of law are animated by both internationalist and territo-
rialist impulses. Part II discusses the importance of identifying the
values that might inform the continued development of international
34. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000); see also Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141 (2001).
35. Of course, where particular domestic nations assert their own policy perspectives,
particularly in public international law contexts, the point that this is an expression of at least a
desire for domestic self-determination is a rather obvious one. The recent "concessions" at the
WTO Doha meeting regarding compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals provides a very recent
example. See text at note 97, infra. Often, the individual claims of domestic nations are
portrayed in opposition to the drive toward supranational standards. See Aoki, supra note 9, at
443 ("There is a marked trend toward favoring ideas like 'upward harmonization' and other
universalizing moves and a concomitant discounting or erasure of the 'local,' with disturbing
effects on the political economy of information that flows through global networks such as the
Internet."). While that is likely to be true as an empirical matter in numerous cases, my purpose
is not to engage in detailed discussion of this critically important topic. Rather, it is to explore
ways that valuing domestic self-determination might enter discussion of the formulation of
international intellectual property jurisprudence in a variety of contexts, including both public
and private international law. In addition, the value of domestic self-determination may be a
useful reference (one of many) against which to test new initiatives, such as that proposed by
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg in this Volume. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C.
Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual
Property Matters, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1065 (2002) (in this issue).
[Vol. 77:1155
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intellectual property jurisprudence. It first considers the difficulty of
identifying discrete "intellectual property" values, and suggests that
the values that ought to inform the development of jurisprudence in
this area need to be drawn from broader concerns associated with the
cultural, economic, and political organization of domestic nations.
Some of the normative claims that can be made for valuing domestic
self-determination in intellectual property laws are then explored,
drawing in part on the work of John Rawls in his text, The Law of
Peoples. 6 Rawls's work provides a useful source of ideas for helping
us think through ways of resolving the tension between domestic self-
determination and untrammeled expressions of domestic self-interest
by individual nations. Part II goes on to speculate, in a preliminary
manner, on some of the ways that the value of domestic self-
determination might contribute to international intellectual property
jurisprudence.
Part III turns to the draft treaty proposal by Professors Dreyfuss
and Ginsburg that is the subject of the principal paper in this Sympo-
sium. 37 This is a major contribution to the development of interna-
tional intellectual property jurisprudence. Building on the draft
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments, 38 the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal seeks to establish uniform
and predictable rules for determining the circumstances in which a
forum may assert jurisdiction over intellectual property litigation that
has significant foreign elements. In addition, the draft treaty seeks to
impose standard rules for the enforcement of judgments in intellec-
tual property cases. Part III considers the extent to which the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal supports the value of domestic self-
determination in intellectual property matters. Given that the focus
of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal is jurisdiction and enforcement, 39
rather than choice of law,40 this might seem an odd line of inquiry. As
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg recognize, the neutrality of their
draft treaty on issues of choice of law may contribute to its accept-
ability and enhance the possibility of its adoption. 4' However, juris-
36. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999).
37. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35.
38. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention on
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at http://www.hcch.net
/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited May 25, 2002) [hereinafter Hague draft].
39. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35.
40. See id. at 1086 (art. 25).
41. See id.
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diction and choice of law are not hermetically sealed topics: as a very
practical matter, fora are frequently selected because it is anticipated
that some substantive advantage might follow,42 suggesting that it is
important to scrutinize jurisdictional rules in the light of the choice(s)
of law(s) that might follow. Choice of law principles that lead to an
overexpansive application of the forum's law, at the expense of laws
that have been developed in and for the territory in which infringe-
ments take place, may be difficult to reconcile with the value of do-
mestic self-determination. Some of the principles articulated in the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft treaty and the accompanying commentary
appear supportive of the view that an individual nation has an appro-
priate interest in the intellectual property laws that are applied to
activities within its territory.4 3 However, the scope that Professors
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg seem to allow for application of these princi-
ples is somewhat less clear. 44
I. TERRITORIALITY IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The territorial quality of intellectual property rights once pro-
vided a riposte to statements heard so often to the effect that Country
A loses billions of dollars as a result of the condition of intellectual
property laws in Country B. 4 The riposte was that such statements
beg an important question. Losses are only meaningful if some right
existed according to the laws of Country B that have been infringed.
In general, intellectual property rights are created through bureau-
cratic action, in the case of patents and registered trademarks, or are
creatures of, and depend for their existence on, individual nations'
42. See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.33A (4th
ed. 2001); see also Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 526 (1990) ("Some plaintiffs would
prefer to litigate in an inconvenient forum with favorable law than to litigate in a convenient
forum with unfavorable law or not to litigate at all.") (Kennedy, J.).
43. See Part III, infra.
44. Id.
45. See Eric H. Smith, Worldwide Copyright Protection Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 559 (1996) (gathering estimates of losses to US copyright industries
caused by offshore piracy of copyright goods); see also INT'L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE,
PIRACY OF U.S. COPYRIGHTED WORKS IN TEN SELECTED COUNTRIES (1985), cited in
MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY 71 (1998). Views to this effect continue to be
expressed by organizations such as the Business Software Alliance (identifying $11.75 billion in
losses due to piracy in 2000). See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SIXTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL
SOFTWARE STUDY 1 (2001), available at http://www.bsa.org/resources/2001-05-21.55.pdf; IFPI,
2001 IFPI MUSIC PIRACY REPORT, at http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/piracy200l.pdf
(claiming that "[m]usic piracy poses a greater threat to the international music industry than at
any other time in its history") (last visited April 29, 2002).
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domestic lawmaking initiatives, as is the case with copyright. Within
a strict territorialist perspective, if Country B did not choose to create
or provide for these rights, intellectual property owners in Country A
could not complain of having "lost" anything at all in Country B.
Proprietors of intellectual property rights in Country A had nothing
in Country B of which they had been deprived.
Informing complaints about losses in foreign territories is a vi-
sion of intellectual property rights as being of a supranational charac-
ter, a vision that may have once been little cognizant of the territorial
reality of international intellectual property relations. Today, that
supranational vision and the emerging international legal reality are
as close as they have ever been. The territorialist perspective is being
supplemented by supranational norms that are emerging apace at the
public international law level and other policies that respond to the
modern circumstances in which intellectual property is often created
in the context of international collaborations, and can be and ren-
dered instantly available almost everywhere.
That said, the territoriality principle remains influential in many
intellectual property contexts, and continues to shape commercial
decision making within individual jurisdictions. A recent episode in
New Zealand illustrates the importance of territoriality to commercial
and artistic decisions relating to the exploitation of intellectual
property rights. In 2001, the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra
announced that it was producing a compact disc featuring a perform-
ance of Hungarian composer B61a Bart6k's viola concerto, a work
that remained unfinished at the composer's death in the United States
in 1945.46 Many previous performances of this concerto used the
version completed by the composer's friend, Tibor Serley, though
Bart6k's son had commissioned a new version of the work in 1995. 47
The New Zealand Symphony Orchestra wanted to perform and
record a further "new" version of the concerto, the work of a local
musicologist who apparently did not rely on the earlier reworkings
from Bart6k's manuscript.
46. Commentators have noted that Bart6k's compositional efforts close to the end of his
life were motivated, at least in part, by the desire to provide his family with an income after his
death. See THE GROVE CONCISE DICTIONARY OF MUSiC 59-60 (1988).
47. One of the recordings of the Bart6k-Serley version of the concerto is Hong-Mei Xiao &
Budapest Philharmonic Orchestra, Viola Concerto, for Viola and Orchestra, Sz. 120 BB 128, on
BARTOK VIOLA CONCERTOS (NAXOS 1998).
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Release of the new version of the Bart6k concerto was to be a
significant event in musical circles.48 However, immediately prior to
the commercial release of the recording, it was reported that the
composer's son threatened the New Zealand Symphony Orchestra
with a copyright infringement action.49 Media reports also recounted
the Orchestra's CEO as saying that he had taken legal advice on the
matter, and had relied on the territorial quality of copyright laws in
both his marketing strategies and in his defense to the allegations
raised by Bart6k's heir.50 While the underlying Bart6k composition
may have remained within copyright protection in the United States,51
it had fallen into the public domain in New Zealand, whose copyright
laws provide for a shorter term.2 The orchestra acknowledged that it
would not be able to sell the work in countries that provide a longer
copyright term for the underlying composition. In Australia and New
Zealand, however, the orchestra's management believed that the
production and sales would be lawful.
Legislative models for increased copyright terms have long been
available to New Zealand lawmakers.53 Perhaps for very good rea-
son,54 they have decided not to adopt them. Assuming that the re-
cording of the Bart6k viola concerto is a runaway Australasian
success, would the sales of the compact disc be an example of losses
48. Serley's version has apparently long been charged with "inauthenticity": the
composer's son, Peter Bart6k, has suggested that Serley made significant additions to the score
that were not in the sketches left behind at his father's death. See David Isadore Lieberman,
Notes on Concerto for Viola and Orchestra, at http://loudounsymphony.org/notes/bartok-
viola.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
49. NZSO and the Expensive Concerto, NEWSROOM, Aug. 21, 2001, at http://www.
newsroom.co.nz/story/61082-99999.html.
50. Id.
51. In general, a work composed in 1945 may be protected in the US for ninety-five years,
assuming all formalities are complied with and renewal terms registered. 17 U.S.C. § 304
(2002).
52. Copyright Act (N.Z.), sec. 22(1) (copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
works expire at the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which
the author dies); Copyright Act 1968 (Aust.), sec. 33(2) (same).
53. Two models are from the United States and the European Union: Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 Tit. I, Pub. L. No.105-298, 112 Stat. 2827; Council
Directive 93/98 EEC of 29 October 1993, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and
Certain Related Rights, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9. See generally Lisa M. Brownlee, Recent
Changes in the Duration of Copyright in the United States and European Union: Procedure and
Policy, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 579 (1996).
54. Perceived problems with the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act led to a
constitutional challenge. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the Act's
constitutionality), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002), cert.
amended by 122 S. Ct. 1170 (2002). For discussion of some of the policy concerns to which the
extension of US copyright terms has given rise, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for
the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 171-75 (1999).
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inflicted on foreign intellectual property owners who are deprived of
a stream of royalties that was "rightfully" theirs? Or should the New
Zealand laws that lead to this result be characterized as a valid exer-
cise of domestic sovereignty, allowing a creditable, but underfunded,
musical establishment to bring new music to a small part of the world,
without the burden of paying royalties to an American estate?
Moreover, because of the "public domain" status of the work, New
Zealand's domestic copyright laws would allow local musical aficio-
nados to have available recordings of three versions of the viola work
to compare: the Bart6k/Serley version, the version commissioned by
the composer's son, and the latest rendering of the work by the New
Zealand Symphony Orchestra.
Images of the nations that provide no or lesser protection in a
particular instance, and of "rogue" or "pirate" nations that provide
no protection at all,"5 seem to prompt different intuitive responses,56
particularly where a nation doing something different actually com-
plies with its public international law obligations.,, There may be
some who, referring even to the "no protection" case, might respond,
"But what if they don't protect intellectual property enthusiasti-
cally?" -celebrating, or, at least, tolerating, this expression of domes-
tic self-determination. It is more likely, however, that complaints
about losses sustained by intellectual property proprietors beg the
question far less in the "no protection" case.
If there are real differences here in our responses, perhaps the
differences reflect something about emerging international intellec-
tual property values and policies. In the modern international intel-
55. Whether the current shape of a domestic nation's intellectual property laws on any
issue is a product of deliberate policy response or is a product of a lack of consideration of a
particular issue is a matter of empirical inquiry. Concerns for values associated with domestic
sovereignty may suggest that the latter cause is somehow more valid than the former. On the
other hand, even a lack of consideration of an issue may be a product of decisions about the
appropriate deployment of legislative resources, which itself might be characterized as an
important expression of domestic sovereignty. Consideration of like issues has arisen in the
state conflict of laws context, when assessment is made of the commitment of each state to the
policies that may be overridden following choice of law analysis. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co.
v. Cont'l Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978).
56. For careful consideration of when international law should defer to domestic policy
choices in the copyright context, see Ginsburg, International Copyright, supra note 12, at 284-88
(discussing, in particular, the case for national rules governing ownership rules in the context of
employment relationships).
57. For example, the Berne Convention, supra note 11, article 7(6), permits member
countries to "grant a term of protection in excess of those provided by the preceding
paragraphs." The Convention also allows member countries to provide shorter terms in some
instances that are not relevant here.
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lectual property law environment, "radical supranationality" may be
as unhelpful, or, at least, as unrealistic, as "radical territoriality." The
"upward harmonization" agenda that energizes the modern public
international law of intellectual property is certainly aimed to gener-
ate more protective, and more uniform, intellectual property laws.58
At the same time, the upward harmonization agenda is tempered by
the continued potency of the territoriality principle in a number of
contexts. This is reflected both in the creation of public intellectual
property instruments and in their interpretation. Consensus-based
lawmaking continues to provide an important, if limited, 9 check on
the development of supranational legal norms, and deference to
domestic policies has been an important principle informing the
interpretation of public international law instruments. The impor-
tance of domestic sovereignty interests has been reflected recently in
the announcements made by the World Trade Organization
("WTO") at the November 2001 meetings in Doha, regarding com-
pulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and the right of individual na-
tions to determine what constitutes a national emergency.60 In private
international intellectual property law, a similar dynamic relationship
between internationalism and respect for foreign laws is also
manifest. In some contexts, domestic courts are quite deferential to
the policy choices reflected in foreign intellectual property law
systems. 61 In others, however, domestic courts, particularly in the
58. For example, Vietnam, long regarded by the United States as a country whose laws and
policies encouraged widespread intellectual property piracy, see Graziella M. Sarno, Comment,
Viet Nam or Bust: Why Trademark Pirates Are Leaving China for Better Opportunities in Viet
Nam, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 291 (1996), signed a bilateral trade agreement with the US in 2000,
Chapter II of which contains important requirements as to the protection of intellectual
property, including a requirement that Vietnam will enact WTO-standard copyright, trademark
and patent laws. Agreement between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam on Trade Relations, July 13, 2000, Ch. II, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-
pacific/text.pdf.
59. As Professor Dinwoodie has pointed out, consensus-based lawmaking in the public
international law of intellectual property has been partly superceded by new models of
lawmaking that respond to the dynamic technological and international context for which
intellectual property laws now need to be forged. Dinwoodie, supra note 34, at 494-501; see also
Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of Rights: Human Rights to Intellectual
Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 334 (1996) ("Given the history of the
international intellectual property system, the notion that either the pre- or post-TRIPS
multilateral system is based upon consensus is still a myth as far as developing countries are
concerned.").
60. See text at note 100, infra.
61. See generally G.W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights,
113 LAW Q. REv. 321, 332 (1997) (identifying the paradox that jurisdictional reticence, in order
to signal respect to foreign sovereignty interests, may have the effect of rendering nugatory the
rights created under the law of the foreign sovereign); see also Section I.B., infra.
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United States, have developed strategies that limit the efficacy of
foreign intellectual property laws in favor of extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic laws.
A. Public International Law
Some responses to perceptions of unjustifiable "losses" to pro-
prietors of intellectual property rights now no longer need to be
merely intuitive. Public international law instruments, most notably
the TRIPs Agreement, 62 provide mechanisms for testing whether
particular domestic policy choices comply with international norms.
Where domestic laws are found wanting, the TRIPs Agreement
provides the means for imposing meaningful remedies, including
trade sanctions.63  While inconsistencies between certain domestic
laws that reflect domestic policy choices and the terms of interna-
tional intellectual property law instruments have long been recog-
nized, the WTO dispute settlement processes now provide
governments with more effective procedural mechanisms for chal-
lenging, and, where negotiations or other, more persuasive, processes
fail, 64 requiring the correction of, domestic intellectual property laws
that do not pass muster. And as these procedural mechanisms gener-
ate substantive results, domestic nations will likely find that past and
future attempts to mold intellectual property laws to suit domestic
policy agenda may need to be tempered, even rethought in their
entirety, in the light of emerging public international intellectual
property law doctrine.
One of the key lessons from the body of law relating to intellec-
tual property that is emerging through the WTO dispute settlement
processes is that the subjection of intellectual property owners'
"rights" to domestic law policies will be tolerated less readily than in
the past.65 An economic "break" given to certain small businesses
62. TRIPs, supra note 11, Annex 1C.
63. W TO Agreement, supra note 11, Annex 2, art. 22; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
& Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute
Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 327-32 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335 (1997); Sue Ann Mota,
TRIPS: Five Years of Disputes at the WTO, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 533 (2000).
64. See generally J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or
Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441 (2000); Adrian
Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (1996).
65. See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
WT/DS50/R (WTO Panel Sept. 5, 1997), affd, WR/DS50/AB/R (WTO App. Body Dec. 19,
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wishing to rebroadcast music, 66 the ability of pharmaceutical compa-
nies to stockpile generic pharmaceuticals ready to go to market at the
end of a proprietary drug's patent term, 67 a decision not to extend
terms for older patents68-these all represented domestic policy
choices about the nature and extent of intellectual property proprie-
tors' rights within particular domestic borders. In whole or in part,
however, these domestic policy choices are no longer acceptable
according to public international law norms, as interpreted and ap-
plied by WTO panels. For US economic interests, where the WTO
processes cannot be relied on, the threat of "Special 301" sanctions
may achieve significant substantive changes to domestic intellectual
property laws, broadly in line with dominant international patterns.69
The agenda of international standardization can also be progressed
by bilateral7 ° or multilateral7" trade agreements. The development of
1997); Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WR/DS114/R (WTO Panel Mar.
17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Stockpiling Report]; Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
WT/DS170/R (WTO Panel May 5, 2000) [hereinafter Canada Patent Term Report]; U.S.-
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (WTO Panel June 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Panel Report].
66. Panel Report, supra note 65.
67. Canada Stockpiling Report, supra note 65.
68. Canada Patent Term Report, supra note 65.
69. "Special 301" refers to a procedure introduced by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), providing for action to be taken against US trading partners
engaging in "unfair competition." These powers were extended by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1998, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (2002), which vests the US Trade
Representative ("USTR") with the power of determining which countries to investigate,
investigations which may lead to retaliation. The amended procedures require the USTR to
annually list countries that allow for the most flagrant violations of protection for US
intellectual property. A "Priority Foreign Country" is a country that inter alia engages in the
most egregious practices that deny protection or equitable market access on the relevant US
products. The Special 301 procedure was used famously with respect to China, which in 1991
was listed as a Priority Foreign Country for failing to adequately protect patents and copyright,
with deleterious effects for US products, especially computer software. Following lengthy
negotiations between China and the US, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between
the two countries in 1992, immediately before the US was about to take retaliatory action
against China. The Memorandum contributed significantly to the enactment of intellectual
property laws in China in line with Western norms. China joined the WNTO on December 11,
2001. China WTO Member, STATESMAN, Dec. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 30169616. For
detailed analysis of the Special 301 procedures, see Kim Newby, The Effectiveness of Special 301
in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S. Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 29 (1995).
70. The recently completed free trade agreement between Vietnam and the United States
is an example of a bilateral trade agreement requiring significant changes in a domestic nation's
intellectual property laws in order to comply with international standards. See supra note 58
and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Draft Agreement, Free Trade Area of the Americas, July 3, 2001, available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft/eng/draft-e.asp. The document, with origins in a 1994
Summit of the Americas, is aimed to remove barriers to trade and investment among all the
states in the Western Hemisphere. The draft agreement includes a "Chapter on Intellectual
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standardized procedural and substantive norms within regional con-
texts, particularly within the European Union, represents the most
vigorous commitment to removing the friction caused by diversity
between national legal systems.72
1. Consensus-based Lawmaking
At the same time, public international intellectual property juris-
prudence continues to reflect the dynamic relationship between
territorialist and internationalist approaches to the development of
intellectual property law. While public international intellectual
property laws create global or regional norms against which domestic
policies and laws may be tested, a complementary perspective, one
that continues to be promoted by the classic public international
lawmaking model,73 is that some degree of international consensus
should be achieved before new norms are promulgated. This ap-
proach reflects the idea that some common ground should be found
amongst nations with diverse approaches to the content and societal
purposes implicated by the particular issue under scrutiny. In the
intellectual property context, one of the earliest indications of the
importance of consensus was the reception of the suggestion by the
German delegates to the 1883 intergovernmental meeting to form the
Berne Union that the national treatment principle be abandoned in
favor of a uniform international copyright law.74 The idea, put before
the meeting by way of a questionnaire, was rejected partly for practi-
cal reasons: it would have required significant modifications of the
international delegates' domestic copyright laws, which could not
Property Rights," which, in addition to requiring compliance with now standard international
intellectual property principles, also requires parties to enact laws substantially equivalent to 17
U.S.C. section 1201(a)(1)(A), which creates a distinct tort for circumventing technological
measures. Id. This standard arguably goes beyond the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, which
requires only that member states provide "legal remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which
are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law." WIPO Copyright Treaty,
supra note 11, art. 11; see also WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 11, art.
18 (containing same requirements with respect to acts not authorized by performers or the
producers of phonorecords, or permitted by law).
72. For discussion on the standardization of intellectual property laws within the European
Union, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 34, at 490-94 (discussing the classic public
international lawmaking model in the copyright context, and evaluating its problems, including
the considerable time needed to achieve international consensus).
74. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 39-40 (1987).
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have been achieved in time.,5 In subsequent drafts, the universalist
approach dropped away in favor of an approach that would allow
more countries to accede to the Convention. 76
As Professor Dinwoodie has cogently demonstrated in his recent
scholarship on the development of international copyright law, the
classic, consensus-based model has been superseded on a number of
fronts.77 In part, the developments he describes are motivated by the
need to allow international intellectual property law to develop with-
out consensus, in order to respond more rapidly to technological and
other challenges.71 The continued drive toward international privati-
zation of intellectual property issues is consistent with this theme.
For instance, the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP")79
has, for most practical purposes,8 taken important disputes touching
on the regulation of trademark rights out of the hands of domestic
tribunals, displacing them by arbitration-like processes, regulated by
the UDRP code and the private institution of contract.8
However, two recent international intellectual policy initiatives
reflect the continued importance of deference to differences between
domestic laws. In its September 2001 report, The Recognition of
75. Ginsburg, supra note 12, at 268.
76. Id. at 269-70.
77. Dinwoodie, supra note 34, at 493.
78. See RYAN, supra note 45, at 141 (describing TRIPs in terms of "'deep integration'-
harmonizing the policies and laws of developing countries with those of the global community-
initiated by American multinational corporations and foreign policymakers") (citation omitted);
see also Dinwoodie, supra note 34, at 494 n.87 (discussing the US constitutional arrangements
that allowed for "fast-track" ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). In addition, Professor Dinwoodie characterizes the
various EC directives relating to intellectual property rights in terms of the shift away from
consensus-based international lawmaking. Id. at 497.
79. ICANN, Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, (Oct. 24 1999), at http://www.icann.
org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm [hereinafter UDRP].
80. The UDRP does not oust the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Id. art. 4(k) (providing
that UDRP proceedings shall not prevent either party from "submitting the dispute to a court of
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution"); see also WIPO, The Management of
Internet Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues: Final Report of the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process, para. 150(v), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/finalreport.html
(Apr. 30, 1999). US courts have interpreted the UDRP consistently with this view. See
Broadbridge Media, LLC v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505,508-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Weber-
Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (N.D. I11.
2000); Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
81. The legal operation of the UDRP is based in part on subscription agreement between a
subscriber and the online service provider. For an exhaustive analysis of the legal
underpinnings of the UDRP processes, see Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 34. See also Wayde
Brooks, Wrestling Over the World Wide Web: ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for
Domain Name Disputes, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 297 (2001).
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Rights and the Use of Names in the Internet Domain Name System, 8 2
promulgated as part of the Second Internet Domain Name Process,83
WIPO considered a range of responses to identifiers other than
trademarks: international nonproprietary names for pharmaceutical
substances, the names and acronyms for international intergovern-
mental organizations, personal names, geographical identifiers, and
trade names.84 WIPO appeared to be most reticent in areas in which
it could not identify an international consensus as to the levels of
protection for these identifiers. 85 With respect to personal names and
geographical indicators, WIPO considered that there was insufficient
international consensus to allow firm recommendations to be made as
to their treatment within the UDRP system, and identified a need for
decisions to be made by the "international community" as to whether
more protective laws should be developed.86  Concerning trade
names, WIPO recognized that, though some international norms
could be identified, "fundamental problems exist in identifying across
differing national approaches what constitutes a protectable trade
name. ' 87 The difficult choice of law issues that might arise in this
context as a result of this diversity prompted WIPO to recommend
that no action be taken in the area of trade names. 88 As a general
note of deference, WIPO concluded: "It will be for the international
community to choose not only whether it wishes to make new rules to
deal with any of the identifiers examined in this Report, but also how
it may wish to develop such rules and implement them."89
The Second Domain Name Process was, however, also charac-
terized as contributing to deliberations by domestic nations as to
whether they should respond to "the insufficiencies of the current
international legal framework" 90 regulating the use of these identifi-
ers. The work by international agencies such as WIPO in drawing
attention to gaps in current domestic responses to protection of these
82. THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET DOMAIN
NAME SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN PROCESS, at http://wipo2.
wipo.int/process2/report/pdf/report.pdf (Sept. 3, 2001).
83. Id. at v.
84. Id.
85. Id. at vi.
86. Id. at vii-viii.
87. Id. at viii.
88. Id.
89. Id. at vii.
90. Id. at vi.
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identifiers may prompt action at the domestic level, enhancing the
possibility for supranational solutions.91
Similarly, the recently promulgated WIPO and Paris Union Joint
Recommendation on the Protection of Marks on the Internet92 reflects
both WIPO's 93 overarching aim of accelerating the harmonization of
international intellectual property laws and a significant degree of
deference to domestic laws.94 The Joint Recommendation includes a
number of important suggestions as to how domestic laws might be
crafted to deal with the problem that "a sign used on the Internet is
simultaneously and immediately accessible irrespective of territorial
location." 95 The Joint Recommendation includes detailed provisions
on the use of trademarks on the Internet and suggested rules for
establishing whether such use has actionable commercial effects
within particular jurisdictions.
With the Joint Recommendation, WIPO did not seek to impose
new supranational norms on domestic nations. Rather, as is de-
scribed in its Preamble, its purpose is to recommend to member states
of the Paris Union and of WIPO that they "consider the use of any of
the provisions ... as guidelines concerning the protection of marks,
and other industrial property rights in signs, on the Internet."96 It is of
course possible that, over time, the Joint Recommendation may come
to represent an international norm. Even without domestic legislative
initiatives, it may, for instance, be adopted by parties to arbitrations.
For present purposes, its importance is not so much in the details of
the proposal but in the technique deployed for its adoption:
persuasion, rather than international fiat.
Also reflecting the continued importance of domestic concerns is
the recent declaration from the WTO at its November 2001 Doha
meeting concerning the ability of individual nations to take measures
91. On the role of WiPO generally in the development of supranational intellectual
property norms, see RYAN, supra note 45, at 125-39.
92. WIPO & PARIS UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, JOINT
RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF MARKS AND OTHER
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SIGNS ON THE INTERNET (Oct. 3, 2001), at http://www.
wipo.org/about-ip/en/development-iplaw/pub845.htm [hereinafter JOINT RECOMMENDATION].
For detailed analysis of the WIPO/Paris Union Joint Recommendation, see Graeme W. Austin,
Trade Marks On-Line: The WIPO and Paris Union Joint Recommendation on the Protection of
Marks on the Internet, 8 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 92 (2002).
93. Reference will be made only to "WIPO," rather than to both "WIPO and the Paris
Union." (WIPO is the administrative body for the Paris Union.)
94. JOINT RECOMMENDATION, supra note 92, at Preface.
95. Id. at pmbl.
96. Id. at Joint Recommendation.
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to protect public health, even if such measures might implicate the
intellectual property rights in pharmaceutical patents owned by for-
eign interests.97 The WTO declared that the TRIPs Agreement "does
not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health," and affirmed that the TRIPs Agreement "can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO Members' right to... promote access to medicines for all." 98
Operationally, the WTO Doha declaration will likely be given effect
through compulsory license regimes; the declaration confirms that
"[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted." 99 In addition, each Member has the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.1°°  Recognizing that developing countries that have
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPs Agreement, the TRIPs Council has been
instructed to "find an expeditious solution to this problem and report
to the General Council before the end of 2002."101
2. Interpretation and Application of International Law Instruments
Once operative, international intellectual property instruments
require interpretation and application. Again, the interpretive proc-
esses evince something of the dynamic relationship between interna-
tionalist aspirations and the enduring importance of deference to
domestic laws. For instance, the recent decision of a panel of the
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO on section 110(5)(A) and (B)
of the US Copyright Act'02-the first international judicial decision to
interpret provisions in the TRIPS Agreement and the Berne Conven-
97. See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/ministe/min0le/mindecl-trips-e.pdf (Nov. 14, 2001); see also Doha
Conference Spells Gains for Indian Drug Firms, Bus. STANDARD, Nov. 20, 2001, at 4; Veena
Jha, Doha: You Might Trip Over the Fine Print, ECON. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, available at 2001
WL 21943350.
98. WTO, supra note 97, T 4.
99. Id. T 5(b).
100. Id. I 5(c).
101. Id. 6; see also WTO OKs Compromise TRIPS Declaration on Cheap Drug Access for
LDCs, MARKETLETTER, Nov. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9081838; T.N.C. Rajagopalan,
TRIPS May Ground India's Hopes for Patent Waiver, BUS. STANDARD, Nov. 26, 2001, at 2;
Jayanta Ghosh, No Gains from Doha, Say Pharma Firms, TIMES INDIA, Nov. 27, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 30779689.
102. Panel Report, supra note 65.
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tion that delimit the scope of exemptions to copyright owners'
rights-reflects both an impulse to curb domestic law approaches to
exemptions from the rights of copyright owners and deference to
policy choices made by individual nations.103
The WTO panel found that the "small business" exemption
provided for by the US Copyright Act 4' went further than was an-
103. See Dinwoodie, supra note 31, at 764-66 (distinguishing between the outcome of the
US section 110(5) case and the reasoning of the panel, which was deferential to domestic
autonomy at several points in its analysis).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) provides:
(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission
embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes
[is not infringement of copyright], unless-
(i) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(ii) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public;
(B) communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission
embodying a performance or display of a nondramatic musical work intended to be
received by the general public, originated by a radio or television broadcast station
licensed as such by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual
transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if-
(i) in the case of an establishment other than a food service or drinking
establishment, either the establishment in which the communication occurs has
less than 2,000 gross square feet of space (excluding space used for customer
parking and for no other purpose), or the establishment in which the
communication occurs has 2,000 or more gross square feet of space (excluding
space used for customer parking and for no other purpose) and -
(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of
which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining
outdoor space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual
portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total
of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than 1
audiovisual device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device
has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of
the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not
more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are
located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
(ii) in the case of a food service or drinking establishment, either the
establishment in which the communication occurs has less than 3,750 gross
square feet of space (excluding space used for customer parking and for no other
purpose), or the establishment in which the communication occurs has 3,750
gross square feet of space or more (excluding space used for customer parking
and for no other purpose) and-
(I) if the performance is by audio means only, the performance is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of
which not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any 1 room or adjoining
outdoor space; or
(II) if the performance or display is by audiovisual means, any visual
portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total
of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than one
audiovisual device is located in any 1 room, and no such audiovisual device
has a diagonal screen size greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of
the performance or display is communicated by means of a total of not
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ticipated by the three-step test provided by article 13 of the TRIPs
Agreement for assessing exemptions to copyright law in domestic
laws. 05 That test requires that permissible exemptions be (1) limited
to certain special cases, which (2) do not conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of a work, and (3) do not unreasonably prejudice the le-
gitimate interests of the right holder. 106 Notwithstanding the adverse
outcome for the United States on the small business exception, the
panel report was deferential to domestic law policies at a number of
points. One of the most pertinent aspects of the panel report for US
intellectual property policy, particularly in the field of copyright, is
the panel's approach to the meaning of "certain" in the three-part
test. The panel interpreted "certain" to mean "clearly defined"; a
defense afforded by a domestic legal system could be valid without
having to "identify each and every possible situation to which the
exception could apply."' 17 The panel's analysis appears to be quite
deferential to nations, such as the United States, whose copyright
laws deploy a broad "fair use" defense in addition to more narrowly
carved exceptions to copyright protections. Many other nations
adopt only the latter system of exceptions.18 The US fair use doctrine
possibly succeeds under the first limb, in that the existence of the
defense and something about its character is clearly ascertainable
from section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976.109 However, the fair use
more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more than 4 loudspeakers are
located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor space;
(iii) no direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or retransmission;
(iv) the transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the
establishment where it is received; and
(v) the transmission or retransmission is licensed by the copyright owner of the
work so publicly performed or displayed.
17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2002).
105. Article 13 of TRIPs, supra note 11, reads: "Members shall confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right
holder."
106. Id.; Panel Report, supra note 65. For commentary on the role of exception clauses in
the development of domestic and international copyright principles, see Sam Ricketson, The
Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions-International Conventions and
Treaties, 1999 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56; Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International
Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369 (1998).
107. Panel Report, supra note 65, 9J 1.110. However, the panel recognized that the stated
legislative purposes might assist in determining whether an exception was sufficiently narrow to
qualify within the requirement that the exception be limited to "certain special cases." See id.,
IT 6.112, 6.157.
108. See Tyler G. Newby, What's Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair
Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1642-46 (1999)
(surveying the fair use exceptions of several GATT-member countries other than the US).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides:
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doctrine remains one of "the most troublesome in the whole law of
copyright," 110 and it certainly may be characterized as a defense for
which it is not possible to identify each and every circumstance in
which it might apply. Notwithstanding these troublesome aspects of
the US approach to defenses, the WTO panel's approach seems to
accommodate it."'
Other aspects of the panel's report also disclose a degree of def-
erence to domestic policy choices. For example, when assessing
whether or not an exception amounted to a "special case" for the
purposes of article 13 of TRIPs, the panel resisted the conclusion that
''an exception or limitation must be justified in terms of a legitimate
public policy purpose".' 12 The panel recognized that, in the light of a
nation's "own history and national priorities", an exception might be
regarded as "special," thereby eschewing normative scrutiny of the
domestic policy justifications for the exception." 3 The precedential
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002).
110. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Princeton
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Fair use is one
of the most unsettled areas of [copyright] law.").
111. Dinwoodie, supra note 31, at 751. See also Newby, supra note 108 (concluding that the
US fair use defense, as it is applied by US Courts, is consistent with article 13 of TRIPs). For a
different analysis, see Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (2000).
112. Panel Report, supra note 65, at $ 6.113,
113. See Dinwoodie, supra note 31, at 765-66 (discussing the difference between the panel's
analysis of the "special cases" requirement, which eschewed a normative analysis, and other
aspects of the panel's analysis of article 13 of TRIPs, where the panel did engage in more
normative analysis of the justifications for the exceptions). For example, when discussing the
normalcy of the means of exploitation that was the subject of the limitation or exception, the
panel observed that one way of assessing this was to consider whether the use of the copyright
work permitted by the limitation or exception competed economically with the rights holders'
exploitation of the work. A use that did compete economically with ways that rights holders
normally derive income from a work (taking into account future uses) would be more likely to
be regarded as conflicting with the normal exploitation of the work. See Panel Report, supra
note 65, at 191 .181, 1.183.
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value of WTO panel adjudications remains uncertain."' However,
the panel's suggestion that a degree of deference toward domestic
policy choices is appropriate when scrutinizing domestic laws for
compliance with international norms may be relevant in subsequent
controversies. 115
B. Private International Law
Like public international jurisprudence on intellectual property,
the private international law of intellectual property also reflects both
territorialist and internationalist approaches to intellectual property
issues that cross international borders. In Anglo-American private
international law, perhaps the best reflection of the continued impor-
tance of territoriality is in the area of subject matter jurisdiction.
In a growing body of copyright jurisprudence on subject matter
jurisdiction, courts are increasingly entertaining the proposition that a
domestic court should ascertain and apply foreign laws. For example,
the English Court of Appeal recently rejected long-held earlier as-
sumptions that a domestic court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign copyright infringement.11 6 The Court rejected the idea
that subject matter jurisdiction over foreign copyrights was barred on
the basis that intellectual property rights were akin to rights in a
foreign land,,'7 and that principles of international comity precluded
the exercise of jurisdiction over rights so closely tied to foreign sover-
eignty interests.118 In addition, the Court considered the actionability
of infringement of foreign intellectual property laws to be a permissi-
114. This issue is comprehensively explored in: Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis
and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj
Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a
Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past:
Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 873 (2001).
115. An issue to be discussed further below is whether this kind of restraint is actually as
supportive of the value of domestic self-determination as a willingness to expand the scope for
permissible exceptions, while engaging in rigorous scrutiny of the policy aims underlying the
exception, and whether or not the exception properly serves those aims. See Section II.D., infra.
116. Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (C.A.); cf Tyburn Productions v.
Conan Doyle, [1991] Ch. 75; Atkinson Footwear v. Hodgskin Int'l Servs. Ltd, [1994] 31 I.P.R.
186 (H.C.) (N.Z.).
117. Cf Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., (1906) 3 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.) (holding that
subject matter jurisdiction did not exist over foreign patent infringement). The Potter holding
was extended to copyrights in Tyburn Productions, [1991] Ch. 75.
118. Cf. British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moqambique, [1893] A.C. 602 (H.L.); see
generally Stephen Lee, Title to Foreign Real Property in Transnational Money Claims, 32
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 607 (1995).
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ble exception1l9 to the Anglo common law rule requiring a tort com-
mitted in a foreign territory to be shown to be wrongful according to
the lex fori before it could be justiciable in a domestic court. 120 In line
with international trends away from insistence on actionability ac-
cording to the lex fori,121 English courts have now recognized that
foreign copyrights are not so exotic as to deny their justiciability in
domestic fora. 122
United States courts have similarly recognized that infringement
of certain foreign intellectual property laws should be justiciable in
domestic fora. This trend is clearest in the copyright context.'23 A
line of recent cases has rejected the idea that infringement of foreign
copyright laws is beyond the jurisdiction of domestic US courts. 24
Indeed, in one case, the Second Circuit anticipated that the district
court might ascertain and apply the copyright laws of at least eighteen
foreign countries.125
Rules are available to courts and litigants to avoid unwieldy or
overly burdensome litigation, such as assuming that the foreign law(s)
and the law of the forum are identical.126 In general terms, though, a
119. The relevant exception to the lexfori rule in foreign torts claims was first recognized by
the Privy Council in Red Sea Insurance Co. v. Bouygues S.A., [1995] 1 A.C. 190 (P.C.).
120. In the U.K., the lex fori rule has been overturned by statute: Private International Law
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (c. 42) ("The general rule is that the applicable law is the
law of the country in which the events consisting the tort or delict in question occur.").
121. See generally G.W. Austin, The Infringement of Foreign Intellectual Property Rights,
113 L.Q.R. 321, 323-24 (1997) (discussing the demise of the lexfori rule).
122. See Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [1999] 1 All E.R. 769 (C.A.) (observing that copyright
infringement is "not... some wrong which is conceptually unknown in English law").
123. In the patents context, for example, compare Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154,
157-58 (7th Cir. 1967) (holding that jurisdiction may be exercised by a federal court over foreign
patent infringement), with Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
408 (N.D. I11. 1972) (holding that court has no jurisdiction where validity of foreign patents is at
issue). With respect to injunctions enjoining infringing activity outside of the jurisdiction of the
forum, see Johns Hopkins University v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For
detailed analysis of the prohibitions against exercising subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
patent laws, see John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier: Comparative
Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 277 (1996).
124. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998);
Armstrong v. Virgin Records, 91 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Carrel v. Shubert Org., 104 F.
Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); World Film Servs. Inc. v. RAI Radiotelevisione Italiana S.p.A.,
1999 WL 47206 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999); London Film Prods. v. Intercontinental
Communications, 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
125. Boosey & Hawkes, 145 F.3d 481.
126. See, e.g., Pearce v. Ove Arup P'ship, [1997] Ch. 293 (H.C.) (presuming similarity of
Dutch and English copyright law); see generally RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW IN
ENGLISH COURTS 147-53 (1998) (discussing English courts' presumption that the content of
foreign law is the same as that of English law); Ginsburg, Cyberian Captivity, supra note 6, at
356 n.23.
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willingness to acknowledge foreign copyright laws evinces a signifi-
cant degree of respect for foreign legal systems. Indeed, areas where
domestic courts might be reluctant to entertain infringement of for-
eign intellectual property rights, most notably in the patent context, 127
seem to be motivated by intense solicitude towards the rights estab-
lished by the laws of foreign sovereigns.128 That is, the rights accorded
by foreign sovereigns are regarded as so important to the domestic
sovereignty interests of the foreign nation that the exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction is rendered inappropriate.129
127. In the English context, see JAMES J. FAWCETr & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-93 (1998) (discussing policy limitations on
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over infringement of foreign patent rights). Under
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, special jurisdictional rules apply for registered rights
whose validity is put at issue by the infringement action. See, e.g., Coin Controls Ltd. v. Suzo
Int'l (U.K.) Ltd., [1997] 3 All E.R. 45 (Ch.); Fort Dodge Animal Health Ltd v. AKZO Nobel
N.V., [1988] F.S.R. 222. A recent analysis of these issues was provided in Sepracor Inc. v.
Hoechst Marrion Roussel Ltd., [1999] F.S.R. 746, 753-54, a case, litigated in a U.K. forum,
involving infringement of different national designations within the European Patent
Convention. The Court held that pursuant to the Brussels Convention it was not open to the
plaintiff to sue in England in respect of the infringement of patents in other countries when the
validity of those patents were in issue.
Art. 16(4) of the Brussels Convention provides:
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile: ... in
proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks,
designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the
Contracting State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken
place or is under the terms of an international convention deemed to have taken place.
Responding to the submission that the case should be struck out simply on the ground that it
would involve the Court in adjudication of foreign patent rights, Sir Hugh Laddie responded,
Even if such a power exists, I would decline to exercise it so as to strike out the
foreign claims. No doubt it is convenient and generally speaking desirable that, say,
the law of Denmark should be considered and applied by Danish Courts. For that
purpose the foreign court would be the forum conveniens. But the courts here
frequently have to determine issues of foreign law....
I have no doubt that one action would be quicker, cheaper and more convenient.
It will reduce the possibility of conflicting decisions on the same [European Patent
Convention] issues."
Sepracor, [1999] F.S.R. at 754.
128. In addition, patent laws may raise difficult practical problems, given the diversity of
international patent laws, leading to fears that courts in one jurisdiction cannot properly
interpret and apply the patent laws of another jurisdiction. See supra note 126. Professors
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg consider that further analysis of the issue of jurisdiction in foreign
patent claims is warranted. See Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1097-98. For this
reason, I do not engage with that debate in this Article.
129. For a particularly stark example, see Plastus Kreativ AB v. Minnesota Mining and
Manufacturing Co., [1995] R.P.C. 438, 439 ("A finding of infringement is a finding that a
monopoly granted by the state is to be enforced. The result is invariably that the public have to
pay higher prices than if the monopoly did not exist. If that be the proper result, then that result
should, I believe, come about from a decision of a court situated in the state where the public
have to pay the higher prices."). See also Laddie, supra note 20, at 402 (describing patent rights
as a form of indirect taxation).
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Ideas about the territorial character of intellectual property
rights probably account for the paucity of US private international
case law engaging with any kind of analysis of the government inter-
ests at stake in the choice of law analysis.130 In US conflict of laws
doctrine, government interest analysis is the occasion for most explicit
analysis of the values and policies underlying substantive law
principles. In the domestic context, a recent decision from within the
Ninth Circuit applied government interest analysis to choice of law
for the tort of misappropriation of a person's name and likeness. In
Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch3, the choice was between the laws
of California and Hawaii, the latter providing less extensive relief
than the former. The claim was based on the publication of photo-
graphs of the plaintiffs, five of whom resided in Hawaii, in a fashion
catalog distributed throughout the United States, including in Cali-
fornia. The Ninth Circuit regarded California to have a relevant
interest in applying its laws, on the basis that "one of the primary
purposes of creating a cause of action in tort is to deter misconduct
within its borders by persons present within its borders.' 13 2 Hawaii
did not have a countervailing interest in "restrict[ing] its residents
from recovery that others could obtain in California" solely because it
had not enacted an equivalent statute applicable to breaches of pub-
licity rights occurring in the latter state.'33 The governmental interest
analysis adopted in Abercrombie & Fitch seems to underscore the
strong interest in having one's own (intellectual property) laws apply
to activities occurring within one's own territory.
In other areas of emerging private international law doctrine
touching on intellectual property issues, deference to the sovereignty
interests of foreign nations in having their intellectual property laws
apply to conduct occurring within their territories is less clear. In a
number of contexts, US domestic courts have departed from a strictly
territorial approach to intellectual property disputes involving activi-
ties in foreign nations. Some of these approaches to cross-border
issues flow from common law developments, or, at least, are judicial
130. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A Vehicle for
Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429 (2001) (highlighting other
explanations).
131. 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
132. Id. at 1006. Here, the court apparently saw a direct analogy between publicity rights
and traffic accidents. The court reasoned that just as a state has an interest in discouraging
unsafe driving on its roads, a state also has an interest in discouraging misappropriation of
personality rights within its borders.
133. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1007.
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glosses on the statutory schemes regulating intellectual property
rights. Others, particularly in the patent context, follow from legisla-
tive developments.
Perhaps the clearest example of a departure from territoriality in
favor of application of domestic norms is the line of cases in which US
courts have endorsed awards of damages under US copyright law for
unlicensed exploitation of copyright works in foreign territories13 4 In
one of the foundational cases in this area, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures,13 the Second Circuit seemed unperturbed by the plaintiffs'
failure to plead a specific breach of the laws of the territory in which
the infringing motion picture was distributed and exhibited without
license: "The plaintiffs made no proof of foreign law, and we cannot
say that the exhibition of the positives abroad was a tort.1' 36 Never-
theless, the Court endorsed the view that damages for foreign in-
fringements were recoverable under US copyright law, as well as
related principles of constructive trust.1 37 A number of courts, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit, have followed suit. 3"
In the trademarks context, the tendency of US courts to apply
the Lanham Act to conduct abroad is well known.139 United States
Courts examine a range of factors to determine whether application
of the Lanham Act to conduct in foreign territories is appropriate,
including the nationality of the parties, the relative effects of the
defendant's activities on commerce in the US as compared with else-
where, whether there was an express purpose to harm US commerce,
and the degree of conflict with foreign laws.140 In a number of cases,
courts have concluded that application of the Lanham Act to conduct
134. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309
U.S. 390 (1940); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988); L.A. News
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lopez
de Arriorua, 948 F. Supp 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc.,
201 F. Supp. 560, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
135. 106 F.2d 45.
136. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 52.
137. Id. ("We need not decide whether the law of those countries where the negatives were
exploited, recognized the plaintiffs' equitable interest; we can assume arguendo that it did not,
for, as soon as any of the profits so realized took the form of property whose situs was in the
United States, our law seized upon them and impressed them with a constructive trust, whatever
their form.").
138. L.A. News Serv., 149 F.3d 987.
139. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v.
Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993 (2d Cir. 1997); Ocean Garden, Inc.'v. Marktrade Co., Inc.,
953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991); cf Totalplan Corp. of Am. v. Colborne, 14 F.3d 824 (2d Cir. 1994);
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
140. Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 642.
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abroad is consistent with the constitutional principle of the regulation
of US commerce. 14'
Somewhat consistent with this trend are cases in which causes of
action that have significant foreign elements have been localized in
the United States. A recent example of this was in National Football
League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 42 which found infringement
under US law for re-broadcasting television programs, where the
ultimate audience for the programs was in Canada. The steps on the
way to reaching the Canadian audience, such as the unauthorized
capture and initial transmissions of the broadcasts, were sufficient to
implicate US law. 143
Transnational cases involving patents and unfair competition
principles also provide examples of liability theories that depart from
a strictly territorialist perspective. While patents are generally re-
garded as strictly territorial,'" statutory initiatives have made it an
infringement of US patent law to supply in or from the United States
the components of a patented invention in a manner that facilitates
the working of the invention in a foreign territory.1 4 In the unfair
competition context, some courts have read international law norms
(spelt out of article 10 of the Paris Convention) into the Lanham Act,
suggesting that domestic courts might have recourse to "suprana-
141. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. ARCO Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1998);
Ocean Garden, 953 F.2d 500.
142. 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000).
143. See also William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
383, 460-67 (2000) (discussing liability theories relevant to the Primetime 24 litigation).
144. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), enacted specifically to override the Supreme Court's holding in
Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), provides:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively
induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States,
shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially
adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in
whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending
that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall
be liable as an infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2002).
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tional" legal norms in domestic cases that have significant interna-
tional elements. 146
One of the most interesting US cases in this area concerned the
extent to which injunctive relief granted under the authority of the
Lanham Act could reach conduct abroad that had effects in the
United States. In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer A G, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York granted an injunction against
the German Bayer firm, precluding it from using the Bayer trade-
mark, of which it was the proprietor in many other foreign countries,
in a manner that caused confusion in the United States with Sterling's
US Bayer trademark. 7  The Second Circuit was thus required to
engage with the tension between Bayer's right to use the Bayer mark
in foreign markets and the deleterious effects that such use might
have on Sterling's legitimate use of the same mark in US-based com-
merce. 48 The breadth of the injunction granted in the lower court,
whose prohibitions included enjoining the use of the "Bayer" name or
mark "in ... any employment notice.., published or reasonably
likely to be distributed within the United States,"'149 prompted the
German company (and, indeed, the German government) 5 ° to com-
plain that the "extraterritorial injunctive provisions impair the ability
of one of Europe's largest corporations to conduct its everyday busi-
ness in its home country and around the world."'51
There is a strong strand of territorialist thinking in the Second
Circuit's observation that "[t]hough Congress did not intend the
Lanham Act to be used as a sword to eviscerate completely a foreign
corporation's foreign trademark, it did intend the Act to be used as a
shield against foreign uses that have significant trademark-impairing
effects upon American commerce."'52 Nevertheless, the Court also
recognized that significant issues were at stake when "the holder of
rights in a mark under German law [is] ordered by a United States
146. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp 684 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding
that the Lanham Act, by incorporating the substantive provisions of the Paris Convention,
creates a federal law of unfair competition).
147. 792 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
148. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 745.
150. The German government appeared as an amicus, concerned that the scope of the
injunction granted by the US district court impinged inappropriately on German sovereignty
interests. Id. at 744.
151. Id. at 745.
152. Id. at 746.
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court to refrain from uses of that mark protected by German law,"'153
and invited the District Court to reconsider the extraterritorial scope
of the injunction. Thus, although a territorial focus was manifest in
parts of its analysis, in other respects, the Court was sensitive to the
international character of the dispute. The District Court was asked
to consider whether it should amend its original injunction in order to
better "balance... the equities to reach an appropriate result protec-
tive of the interests of both parties. '154 The Second Circuit also sug-
gested that "an appropriately limited injunction" would include "only
those extraterritorial provisions reasonably necessary to protect
against significant trademark-impairing effects on United States
commerce." 55
The "significant" effects standard156 also implied that the basis for
exercising jurisdiction under the Lanham Act dictated the scope of
relief that might be afforded US trademark proprietors in interna-
tional cases of this kind. Hence, the Bayer court can be seen to be
actively engaged in forging substantive standards for an environment
in which it has become inevitable that trademark use that might be
legitimate in one territory will bump up against other, equally legiti-
mate, rights of other parties in other territories. 157
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE
The approach of the Bayer court toward fashioning an appropri-
ate remedy in the light of the international and domestic contexts
anticipates, and underscores the importance of, Professor Din-
woodie's recent scholarship advocating a choice of law approach that
would require domestic courts to engage more directly with interna-
tional intellectual property values and policies in the shaping of inter-
national intellectual property jurisprudence. 5 8 In private interna-
153. Id. at 747.
154. Id. (quoting Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir.
1987)).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Cf. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001) (imposing a "likelihood of confusion"
standard for infringement of trademark rights).
157. See also Buti v. Impressa Perosa S.A., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (testing whether
trademark use by a foreign entity in the United States was sufficient to "substantially affect" US
commerce); see generally Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce,
49 S.C. L. REV. 695 (1998).
158. See Dinwoodie, supra note 31; Dinwoodie, supra note 34.
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tional intellectual property law, Professor Dinwoodie seeks to
displace both the strictly territorialist approach to transborder dis-
putes as well as some of the "localizing" techniques adopted by US
courts. 159 Instead, courts seized of transnational disputes would "con-
sider whether the international dimension implicated policies of other
states or the international copyright system, and develop (and apply)
a substantive rule of copyright law that best effectuates this range of
policies."160
Professor Dinwoodie suggests that the sources of law to which
courts should have recourse when developing these substantive rules
might include international agreements and practices, national and
regional laws, developing post-national groupings, and conflicts val-
ues. 61 From these, and possibly other, sources, courts would distill
substantive law responses that, while perhaps not recognizable ac-
cording to any one of the domestic laws potentially implicated, 162
would be informed by judicial engagement with the values underlying
all of them.
At the public international law level, the emergence of suprana-
tional intellectual property law regimes, and the inevitability of their
continued development and promotion, has prompted debate about
the kinds of values that ought to inform the development of this body
of law, the processes by which intellectual property values might be
identified, articulated and developed, and the parties and institutions
that should be involved in these processes. 163 In turn, these concerns
prompt inquiry into whether intellectual property values can be
identified that can guide the continuing formulation of modern inter-
national intellectual property law. It may be, however, that the
search for intellectual property values that will assist in the construc-
tion of intellectual property values will prove illusory. Instead, it may
be more productive to consider intellectual property values as part of
a broader set of legal policy issues that are relevant to the organiza-
tion of domestic states: policy issues that will likely be resolved in a
159. See, e.g., NFL v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000) (copyright);
Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade Co., 953 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1991) (trademark); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int'l Co., 150 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1998) (trademark).
160. Dinwoodie, supra note 34, at 543 (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 552.
162. Id. at 558-69 (suggesting courts adopt "compromise solutions" where two potentially
applicable laws offer disparate solutions to transborder copyright issues).
163. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 34; Heifer & Dinwoodie, supra note 34.
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diverse range of ways, depending on individual nations' political,
cultural, and economic circumstances.164
A. Intellectual Property Values
In public international law, concern for the values that intellec-
tual property laws are meant to serve might inform the content of the
documents that are promulgated by international lawmaking bodies.
In addition, identification of intellectual property law values may
guide the interpretation of international intellectual property law
instruments. For instance, in the WTO panel decision regarding
section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, some aspects of the interpre-
tive task that faced the panel involved more or less objective ques-
tions of construction, such as determining whether the "minor
exceptions" doctrine may be applied to even to those rights, such as
broadcasting and communication to the public, 165 for which the Berne
Convention makes no express provision for exemptions. 166 However,
other aspects of the WTO Panel's interpretive task had the potential
at least to be rather less objective, including the tasks of determining
what comprises a "normal exploitation of the work,"'167 or what ex-
emptions might "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder."'168
Numerous questions requiring value judgments might arise in fu-
ture cases where analysis of the issue of compliance with, and thereby
the interpretation of, international law instruments is raised. For
instance, in the computer software context, it is clear that failure to
protect computer programs in object code as copyright works under
the terms of the Berne Convention would be a clear breach of article
10 of TRIPs.169 But other issues might be less easily resolved. What if
164. See generally Integrating Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 25.
165. Panel Report, supra note 65, at 91 6.47-6.66 (concluding that the minor exceptions
doctrine was included by implication in articles 11 and llbis of the Berne Convention, and that
the minor exception doctrine was incorporated into the TRIPs agreement by article 9.1 of the
latter document).
166. Berne Convention, supra note 11. Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention expressly
provides for exceptions for the reproduction right. No express provision for exceptions is made
with respect to other relevant rights, including the rights of public performance, communication
to the public (art. 11) or broadcasting (art. llbis).
167. TRIPs, supra note 11, art. 13.
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 10.1 ("Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected
as literary works under the Berne Convention (1971).").
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it is thought that the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test 170 that
is adopted by some US courts for determining the degree of
protection for computer software is too vigorously applied, leaving
too little scope for protection? 7' What of a legal system that sets a
high bar for qualification of a work as a derivative work 172- or which
renders states within a federal system immune from suit for patent
infringement?'73
Likewise, in the trademarks context, what are the parameters of
the defense for "fair use of descriptive terms," a defense whose un-
certain scope seems little clarified by the requirement that "account
[be taken] of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark
and of third parties"? 174 Or, with respect to patents, what "interests of
third parties" need be taken into account for the purposes of the
construction and application of article 30 of TRIPs? 175
In the private international law context also, international intel-
lectual property law values might inform courts' decisions in a variety
of contexts. Analysis of intellectual property law values might be
appropriate when courts are asked to develop new doctrine, particu-
larly in contexts, such as in the Bayer litigation,'176 where the interests
of domestic and foreign proprietors of intellectual property might
clash, or where there is potential tension between the extraterritorial
170. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see
generally Julian Velasco, Note, The Copyrightability of Nonliteral Elements of Computer
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1994).
171. Austin, supra note 20, at 608-10 (discussing different international approaches toward
the "filtering" out of unprotected material in computer software infringement actions). For a
US approach that differs from that adopted by the Altai court, see Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
172. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(requiring that a work based on an earlier public domain work exhibit "elements of difference
that amounted to a significant alteration"); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th
Cir. 1983) (requiring a "sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative
work"). For rigorous critique of this line of cases, see Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts aid
Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming 2002).
173. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999); Fla. Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); see generally Mitchell N.
Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to "Fix"
Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2001).
174. TRIPs, supra note 11, art. 17 ("Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.")
175. Id. art. 30 ("Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owners, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.")
176. See supra note 147-57 and accompanying text.
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application of domestic laws and foreign sovereignty interests. 177 As I
have argued elsewhere, 178 decisions about whether to localize an
infringement within the forum, or to apply a single governing law to a
dispute, rather than the laws of the various countries in which in-
fringements take place, may be characterized as issues of social pol-
icy, whose analysis may usefully be informed by consideration of the
values that might be served by adopting one or other of the choices
available to a forum seized of a transnational dispute. And if Profes-
sor Dinwoodie's suggestion that courts develop a substantive law
approach to choice of law in transnational intellectual property dis-
putes takes hold, 17 9 there would be considerable scope for courts to
engage with scrutiny of underlying values and policies of the different
domestic rules that may be in conflict.
But is it really possible to identify discrete intellectual property
values? Some commentators have implied as much, when they have
argued that the internationalization of intellectual property is usurp-
ing the values that underlie discrete bodies of domestic intellectual
property law. These concerns have been expressed most passionately
in the copyright law context. Writing in 1995, shortly after the pas-
sage of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,180 David Nimmer
prophesized that US copyright law was about to be transformed into
an instrumentality for serving the interests of international trade,
rather than the goals of domestic copyright law.' 81 Professor Nimmer
was concerned that the goals of copyright law were about to be
usurped by other, external agenda, which would override the careful
checks and balances articulated in the copyright statutes and the case
law they generated. 182 Professor Nimmer suggested that, post-TRIPS,
US copyright could no longer be regarded as "rooted in the Copy-
right Clause of the Constitution.' 1 83 This theme has been continued
by other commentators, including Professor Crews, who suggests that
harmonization of laws "has brought distinct change to US law in ways
177. See generally Bradley, supra note 10.
178. Austin, supra note 20.
179. Dinwoodie, supra note 34.
180. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4833-34 (1994).
181. David Nimmer, The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385 (1995).
182. For discussion of similar concerns expressed in the English context, where intellectual
property commentators have complained that the "purity" of Anglo copyright law has been
tainted by European Directives, see David Vaver, The Copyright Mixture in a Mixed Legal
System: Fit for Human Consumption?, 5.2 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2001), at http://www.ejcl.
org/ejcl/52/art52-3.html.
183. Nimmer, supra note 181, at 1412.
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contrary to the fundamental purposes of copyright law and its social
objectives."184
The concern that core intellectual property law values risk being
usurped by the continuing emergence of supranational norms, par-
ticularly those norms that are generated in the international trade
context, might be more compelling were it possible to identify with
precision what the policies are that intellectual property laws are
meant to serve. In some contexts, the policies underlying legislative
initiatives may be quite obvious. I discuss below, for instance, a
recent legislative innovation in New Zealand trademark law that is
designed to address some of the constitutional challenges that have
been brought by a number of Maori tribes in the intellectual property
context.185 In other contexts, identifying "core" intellectual property
values might be quite difficult, however, particularly in cases of doc-
trinal uncertainty.
In US law, an obvious source for core intellectual property val-
ues are the constitutional clauses that provide the foundation for the
key federal schemes. However, the constitutional edicts concerning
the regulation of commerce' 86 and promoting the progress of science
and useful arts187 are probably insufficient to tell us how to resolve the
innumerable policy issues that arise almost on a daily basis in modern
intellectual property law. Of course, some broad principles might be
identified, such as the idea that "creative people ought to get
paid" 188-but this does not tell us how much they should be paid 189 or
exactly what they should be paid for, nor does it help identify what
countervailing principles might temper even this apparent truism.
What are the intellectual property values that tell us how to strike an
appropriate balance between freedom of contract and fair use
rights,' 90 for instance, or between the policies promoted by the Lan-
184. Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or
Cultural Progress?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 117, 118 (1998).
185. See infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
187. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
188. This proposition was recognized by the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954), where the Court held: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered."
189. Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Exclusive Right to Their Writings": Copyright Versus Control in
the Digital Age, 7 N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 136, 140 (2001).
190. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a shrinkwrap
license that expands the scope of protection afforded by copyright law survives federal pre-
emption). For a contrary view, where a contract was reached without bargaining, see Info.
Handling Services. Inc. v. LRP Publications, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1571 (E.D. Pa. 2000). See
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ham Act and those promoted by copyright law,191 or between "author-
focused" and "efficient-dissemination-focused" approaches to
interpretation of privileges afforded by the copyright statute? I92
These, and innumerable other topics, raise issues on which reasonable
people are likely to continue to disagree. Constitutional foundations
provide only vague guidance as to their resolution. Given the dy-
namic nature of intellectual property lawmaking and the diversity of
interests that seek representation in the process, 193 it may often be
very unclear what the intellectual property policies are that risk being
overridden by trade policies, as intellectual property laws continue to
internationalize.
And, even if specific intellectual property values can be identi-
fied, they are quite likely to change over time. In the US copyright
context, for instance, the current era might be described as one that
valorizes private property interests protected by intellectual property
law over the idea that society's interests should dictate the extent of
private monopolies.9 4  Some commentators contrast this with the
policies that dominated in earlier times, where the rights of intellec-
tual property proprietors were part of a bargain with society: rights
were afforded to authors only if, and only to the extent that, such
rights served the public good. 195 But observations about the dominant
ideas underlying intellectual property law in the current era are
insufficient to dictate the outcomes of difficult policy issues that will
arise as intellectual property law continues to develop on the interna-
generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53 (1997) (generally supporting the Pro-CD approach
where contractual terms at variance with copyright norms are conspicuous).
191. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) ("If
material covered by copyright law has passed into the public domain, it cannot then be
protected by the Lanham Act without rendering the Copyright Act a nullity.").
192. In New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), involving the scope of the privilege
afforded under 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) to proprietors of a copyright in a "collective work" to
reproduce and distribute "any revision of that collective work," Justice Stevens, writing for the
dissent, characterized the approach of the Court, which held that the privilege did not extend to
dissemination of electronic versions of individual articles, as subverting the "fundamental goal
of copyright law in favor of a narrow focus on 'authorial rights."' Id. at 520.
193. For detailed discussion of the lobbying efforts of the various factions that contributed
to the shape of US copyright law, see JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 35-69 (2001).
194. For a stark example of this perspective finding expression in copyright litigation, see
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.COM, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("Copyright ... is not designed to afford consumer protection or convenience but, rather, to
protect the copyrightholders' property interests.").
195. See LITMAN, supra note 193, at 77-88. For a contrasting view, see Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1613
(2001).
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tional scene. 196 As Professor Ginsburg has so compellingly estab-
lished in the copyright context, a range of policy concerns,
foundational principles, and values has informed copyright law from
its beginnings. 197 This suggests that courts and policymakers in the US
tradition are able to tap a fairly extensive and diverse justificatory
repertoire when formulating resolutions to the innumerable issues
that arise as copyright law continues to be forged and disputes re-
solved.
More fundamentally, to focus on intellectual property values may
be to focus on the wrong set of issues. However venerable and how-
ever much the intellectual property community may be interested in
them, intellectual property policies are not-or, I suggest, should not
be regarded as-ends in themselves. To the extent that intellectual
property policies and values can be identified, it might be more help-
ful to regard them as aspects of much broader issues of public policy.
Policies that help ensure that populations get fed, enjoy the benefits
of literacy, are healthy, have viable agricultural bases, and can par-
ticipate in technological and cultural development"" -these seem to
be the kinds of policies that should have priority in any analysis of the
values that intellectual property laws are meant to serve.
Intellectual property rights impact upon the public199 administra-
tion of individual states in a range of contexts: technological,2°° cul-
tural,0 1 medical,202 agrarian,2 3 political,2°4 and may impact significantly
196. See Austin, Isolationism, supra note 21.
197. For an historical perspective on this issue, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two
Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990);
see also Ginsburg, supra note 189.
198. Ensuring that a country enjoys peaceable race relations may also raise important
intellectual property issues: see the discussion of the New Zealand Trade Marks Bill 2001, infra
notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
199. Some commentators have identified tension between the role of intellectual property
rights in the public administration of the state and their characterization as "private" rights.
See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 11, at pmbl. (stating that "intellectual property rights are 'private'
rights," while at the same time "recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and technological
objectives"). Drawing on the work of Legal Realists, Professor Aoki has discussed in detail the
tension between the asserted privacy of intellectual property rights and the state mechanisms
that are required to create and enforce them. See Aoki, supra note 9, at 449-53.
200. In patent law, this is virtually a truism. But see Peter Drahos, Biotechnology Patents,
Markets and Morality, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 441, 442-45 (1999) (suggesting that
governments have increased the number of patents granted without considering the "broader
public ethic").
201. Consider, for example, the comments of former Register of Copyrights on the cultural
importance of copyright law: "Though their true influence is dimly understood at best, a
nation's copyright laws lie at the roots of its culture and intellectual climate. Copyright provides
the inducement for creation and dissemination of the works that shape our society and, in an
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on marketplace morality.2 05 Different nations will face different
challenges with respect to each of these and other policy concerns for
which intellectual property rights might be relevant. The connections
between intellectual property rights, important issues of public policy,
and the reality of diversity in the individual nations' domestic
circumstances would seem to support the continued viability and
relevance of the territoriality principle, even as that principle is
coming under increasing pressure to yield. And it is the inevitability
of differences in the circumstances of different nations-social, eco-
nomic, political, even climatic differences-that suggests that defer-
ence to domestic law choices as to how to shape intellectual property
laws should itself be regarded as a key value that ought to inform the
construction of international intellectual property jurisprudence.
B. Experimentation in Domestic Intellectual Property Law
In important respects, the value of domestic self-determination is
already reflected in the degree of experimentation that occurs in
crafting national or regional intellectual property laws. Self-conscious
experimentation-trying out ideas in order to accommodate domestic
circumstances-occurs in a range of domestic intellectual property
law contexts. 2°6 An obvious benefit of encouraging domestic experi-
imperfect and almost accidental way, represents one of the foundations upon which freedom of
expression rests." Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-
Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1050 (1968).
202. See, e.g., John Robinson Thomas, New Challenges for the Law of Patents, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD 165-66 (Charles
E.F. Rickett & Graeme W. Austin eds., 2000); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in
the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813
(2001).
203. See generally DANIEL CHARLES, LORDS OF THE HARVEST (2001); JACK RALPH
KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY,
1492-2000 (1988).
204. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 288 (1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998) (identifying the furtherance of democratic
principles as a central purpose of copyright law and arguing that the internationalization of
copyright law, in itself, will not necessarily contribute to the further development of copyright's
democracy constitutive potential).
205. Daniel M. McClure, Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 13, 32 (describing the promotion of marketplace morality as
one of the purposes of trademark law).
206. There are connections here with theories of regulatory competition in the US federal
context, developed particularly in the area of competition for incorporations. For detailed
analysis (and rigorous critique) of these theories, see Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition
Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998). These issues are
explored in the cyberspace context in Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information
[Vol. 77:1155
VALUING "DOMESTIC SELF-DETERMINA TION"
mentation in crafting intellectual property laws is that domestic na-
tions (or quasi-federal units, such as the European Community) can
serve as laboratories for testing intellectual property initiatives.2°7 For
the US, laws enacted in compliance with the European Database
Directive might provide an example. For various reasons, enactment
of sui generis database legislation in the US has stalled.208 If the idea
that US database legislation be enacted is revived,29 the experience in
Europe will now provide US lawmakers with important information
as to the viability of one model for database legislation.210 There is
now a body of case law arising under the laws of individual European
nations that have enacted laws in compliance with the Directive " '
that may provide helpful guidance for US judges if they are required
to engage with broader policy issues under any US database law.
The United States' own Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") is itself providing an important resource for other juris-
dictions, as they consider how best to craft copyright laws to meet the
challenges of the digital environment. 212 The DMCA and its foreign
equivalents are experimental simply for the reason that they are new
additions to copyright law that are focused on new technologies
whose future development is unpredictable. Indeed, the DMCA has
been described as "avowedly experimental," even within purely
domestic law terms. 23 As Professor Bill Cornish points out, the
experimental character of the DMCA is manifest in the built-in early
Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1998).
207. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1497-99 (1987) (book review) (making this argument in the US federalist context).
208. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Database Protection and the Circuitous Route Around
the United States Constitution, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW WORLD, supra note 202, at 9; Michael Freno, Note, Database Protection:
Resolving the U.S. Database Dilemma with an Eye Toward International Protection, 34
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165 (2001).
209. See Transcript of Press Conference of Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA) and Rep. James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI), TECH L.J., Mar. 29, 2000, at http://www.techlawjournal.com/congl07
/database/20010329asp (discussing the possibility of introducing database legislation into
Congress).
210. See generally Stephen M. Maurer et al., Europe's Database Experiment, 294 SCIENCE,
Oct. 26, 2001, at 789.
211. See, e.g., British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., CHAN/2001/0632/A3
[2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268, July 31, 2001; see also Maurer et al., supra note 210.
212. See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROP. DIRECTORATE INDUS. CAN., CONSULTATION PAPER
ON DIGITAL COPYRIGHT ISSUES (2001) (Canada); MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV. MANATU
OHANGA, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1994-A DISCUSSION PAPER
(2001) (New Zealand).
213. William Cornish, Introductory Comments delivered at the 2001 ALAI Congress, at




reviews of its own operation.2 14 Through this process, it might be
discovered that the anti-circumvention measures and other aspects of
the DMCA were an excellent experiment, an outcome that might
encourage more nations to adopt them. On the other hand, it is
possible that they may be regarded as having unfortunate conse-
quences, possibly even prompting them to be rethought.215
A second sense in which it is appropriate to characterize intellec-
tual property laws as experimental has to do with the relationship
between intellectual property law and other legal institutions. Refer-
ring to copyright law's relationship with contract, the Copyright
Office has recently noted that, in the US context, movements at the
state level towards removing impediments to enforcement of non-
negotiated license agreements and the technical protection measures
that are legally enforced by the DMCA may mean that rights holders,
rather than Congress, will increasingly come to "determine the land-
scape of consumer privileges in the future." '216 While the Copyright
Office decided that the issue of preemption of contractual provisions
was beyond the scope of its recent section 104 report,2 17 it also ac-
knowledged the importance and complexity of the issue. 218 Charac-
terizing copyright law as providing a background of default provisions
against which parties are generally free to order their own commer-
cial dealings to suit their needs and the realities of the marketplace,
the Copyright Office nevertheless recognized that if "consumer
privileges" become unreasonably prejudiced a case could be made for
statutory change.2 19
Likewise, the relationship between intellectual property law and
competition law has recently occupied the attention of a number of
214. Id.; see Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
215. A "wait and see" approach to the issue of whether the DMCA is overreaching appears
to be currently adopted by courts. See, for example, Judge Kaplan's discussion in Universal City
Studios, Inc, v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affid, Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), of whether the methods of encryption that are
bolstered legally by the DMCA would preclude access to public domain works. Judge Kaplan
noted that this "does not yet appear to be a problem, although it may emerge as one in the
future." Id. at 338 n.245. The Second Circuit cited this observation with approval in Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley. Presumably, if a serious problem of "locking up" public domain
works is identified, some further analysis of the scope of the DMCA might be appropriate.
216. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 164, available at http://www.
loc.gov/copyright/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-l.pdf (2001).
217. Id. at 163.




commentators, 220 courts, 221 and policymakers. 222  For instance, the
recently promulgated report 223 from the U.K. Office of Fair Trading
on the application of the U.K. Competition Act 1998 to agreements
and conduct which concern intellectual property rights identifies a
number of contexts in which intellectual property proprietors' control
over the exploitation of their rights may need to give way to competi-
tion law policies.2 4
Some intellectual property experiments pursued by domestic na-
tions are unlikely to implicate public international law obligations
because they offer standards that are more protective than interna-
tional law norms. International intellectual property treaties gener-
ally set minimum standards -they do not impose a ceiling on the level
of protection domestic nations may afford to intellectual property
holders.225 Indeed, the ability of domestic nations to provide greater
protection is often specifically provided for in public international law
instruments.226
Other kinds of domestic law experiments may have a less com-
fortable existence in the spotlight of public international law norms,
220. See generally Ian Eagles, Intellectual Property and Competition Policy: The Case for
Neutrality, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD,
supra note 202, at 285; Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual
Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409 (2001);
Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913 (2001).
221. See, e.g., Radio Telefis Eirean and Indep. Television Publ'ns Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n
[1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (holding that copyright is subject to EU prohibitions against misuse of
monopoly powers); Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1972) (misuse of
patent rights doctrine); DSC Communications v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996)
(misuse of copyright).
222. See, e.g., U.K. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-A
DRAFT COMPETITION ACT 1998 GUIDELINE, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/html/comp-
act/technical-guidelines/oft4l8.html (2001) (discussing the relationship between intellectual
property rights and competition law policy).
223. See id.
224. For instance, refusal to license an intellectual property right might be regarded as abuse
of a dominant position in some circumstances. Id. $ 3.7.
225. See e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, art.
1702 ("A Party may implement in its domestic law more extensive protection of intellectual
property rights than is required under this Agreement, provided that such protection is not
inconsistent with this Agreement."); Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 19 ("The provisions
of this Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater
protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the Union."); TRIPs supra note
11, art. 1.
226. This is the case with some parts of the anti-circumvention provisions in the DMCA, for
instance, which go beyond the requirements of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, with which it
sought to comply. See supra note 71.
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however. Another example from New Zealand may help to illustrate
the point. Claimants from a number of Maori iwi (tribes) have
brought a claim against the Crown entitled, "The Indigenous Flora
and Fauna and Maori Intellectual and Cultural Property Claim" or
"WAI 262."227 The forum is the Waitangi Tribunal, a statutory quasi-
judicial body whose purpose is to investigate grievances by Maori
against the Crown that allege breaches of the Crown's obligations
under the Treaty of Waitangi, a treaty that guarantees Maori, inter
alia, "te tino rangatiratanga" ("full chieftainship") over "taonga"
("treasured possessions").28 Part of the WAI 262 claim concerns
whether the New Zealand Parliament had the right to legislate as is
has done in the area of intellectual property law without proper
consultation with Maori.229 As part of a response to Maori concerns
in the broader intellectual property context, the New Zealand legisla-
ture promulgated a draft Trade Marks Bill that would control, and, in
some circumstances, even prohibit, the use of certain Maori words
and designs as trademarks.230
The New Zealand Trade Marks Bill is a domestic legislative in-
novation, which may provide a means of modernizing New Zealand's
trademark law, while also addressing key issues of representational
governance within New Zealand's unique constitutional framework.
The Bill is designed with domestic circumstances in mind, and has no
extraterritorial aspirations except to the extent that foreign proprie-
tors may be precluded from securing registration of certain Maori
words and symbols in the New Zealand trademark system. 31 Foreign
proprietors' marks could be rejected on the basis that their registra-
227. See Waitangi Tribunal, Report on Activities: Claims in Hearing, at http://www.
knowledge-basket.co.nz/waitangi/about/inqhear.html#cl. Amended pleadings in this proceeding
were filed in October 2001.
228. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975, sched. 1, art. 2 available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/reprint/text/1975/sc/114scl.html (Oct. 10, 1975).
229. "The Crown, in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles, has implemented
legislation and policy in relation to Ngati Porou flora and fauna without the permission of Ngati
Porou." Statement of Claim filed by Ngati Porou, Oct. 19, 2001, para. 56.7 (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Ngati Porou Statement of Claim].
230. Trade Marks Bill (N.Z.).
231. For example, in some parts of the world "ki ora" is a brand of fruit drink. In New
Zealand, "kia ora" (pronounced very similarly) is one of the most common forms of greeting,
meaning literally "may you be well," the Maori version of "gidday," albeit a considerably more
poetic one. Under the Bill, "ki ora" may have difficulty being registered or surviving as a
trademark, notwithstanding its potential to differentiate one brand of fruit drink from another.
(Currently, the website "www.kiora.com" is used by a webdesign company, which gives a Utah
address on its site. Interestingly, the website acknowledges a Maori provenance for its trade
name. The website includes the following: "Kia ora -interj. from Maori meaning Hello, Good
Day, Thank you. Kiora is a greeting, a welcome, a thanks.")
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tion is unacceptable according to a Maori advisory body charged with
advising the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand as to the
cultural appropriateness of individual trademarks.232
It may be possible to defend such a system on the ground that
the refusal to register is justified on the basis that use of a particular
Maori term as a trademark would be "contrary to morality or public
order," an established exception to national treatment provided for in
the Paris Convention.233 The viability of this defense may depend on
how broadly the "morality" and "public order" defenses are inter-
preted. In New Zealand, the concerns of Maori are not confined to
registrability of marks that are themselves offensive. 234 Some Maori
have argued that it is not the role of the central government to be
according any property rights in Maori symbols or words.235 The New
Zealand trademark system may eventually come to impose strict
controls on the registrability of a potentially large number of trade-
marks. It will likely be the system that will require justification, rather
than individual decisions as to whether registration of individual
marks would threaten public order or morality.
If enacted, the New Zealand trademarks legislation would pro-
vide an example of why deference to domestic experimentation in
crafting intellectual property laws to suit domestic circumstances
might be regarded as an important value that can usefully inform
thinking about the shaping of modern international intellectual prop-
erty jurisprudence. New Zealand is vigorously engaged in a decoloni-
232. The Bill enshrines in legislative form previous New Zealand trademark law practice;
concerns relating to cultural sensitivity have long been taken into account in assessing the
registrability of trademarks under the New Zealand Trade Marks Act 1953.
233. Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 6quinquies.B.3. The main operative provisions of
the Paris Convention are incorporated into TRIPs by art. 2.1 of the latter.
234. Cf. Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999); Doris Estelle
Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property
Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, (1998) (discussing various legal remedies
against misappropriation of cultural artifacts).
235. See, e.g., Ngati Porou Statement of Claim. The Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples includes a clause requiring restitution of intellectual property rights taken
without authorization. See United Nations Econ. and Social Council, Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 12, available at http://www.usask.ca/native
law/ddir.html (Aug. 1993) ("Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the
past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical
sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing arts and literature,
as well as the right to restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.").
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zation agenda. 236  Numerous New Zealand law reform agenda are
directed at that issue, 237 as New Zealand policy makers struggle to
achieve sound race relations in a country scarred by the abuses of
colonization and a history of race and land wars.23  The shaping of
domestic intellectual property laws in ways that are sensitive to the
concerns of Maori, including initiatives such as the Trade Marks Bill,
has become an important issue in the decolonization agenda, an
agenda that contributes significantly to domestic race relations pol-
icy. 239
While the circumstances of production and consumption of in-
tellectual property are increasingly international in character, claims
may be made for individual nations to develop unique solutions for
their own domestic circumstances. In this context, acknowledging the
value of domestic self-determination might expand our understanding
of terms such as "public order" and "morality." More profoundly,
acknowledging the value of domestic experimentation might be ap-
propriate to take into account when drafting international intellectual
property instruments, so that innovations such as these do not have to
be tested against concepts that accommodate them only awkwardly, if
at all.
C. Restraining Domestic Self-Interest
But if domestic experimentation is to be valued, how might the
risk that domestic self-interest will always trump the interests of
236. See generally JANE KELSEY, A QUESTION OF HONOUR? LABOUR AND THE TREATY
(1990).
237. See generally ANDREW SHARP, JUSTICE AND THE MAORI (1991). A number of New
Zealand statutes refer explicitly to the Treaty of Waitangi as providing fetters on the exercise of
executive power. For example, the State-Owned Enterprises Act, a major piece of New
Zealand law regulating the national economy, provides: "Nothing in this Act shall permit the
Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi."
State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 124 § 9, available at http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz
/gpacts/public/text/1986/se/124se9.html (Dec. 19, 1986). This section was relied on in a case
involving the alienation of assets by the Crown, as a basis to prevent further alienation without
consultation with Maori tribes that may have claims to the relevant land. N.Z. Maori Council v.
Attorney-General [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641 (C.A.). Claims by Maori relating to intangible rights,
including intellectual property rights, are likely to be increasingly important in the
decolonization agenda, given the widespread alienation of tangible assets (principally land) that
has occurred since the colonization of New Zealand under the authority of the British Crown.
238. See generally JAMES BELICH, THE NEW ZEALAND WARS AND THE VICTORIAN
INTERPRETATION OF RACIAL CONFLICT (1989).
239. See generally DAVID V. WILLIAMS, MATAURANGA MAORI AND TAONGA: THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF TREATY RIGHTS HELD BY IWI AND HAPU IN INDIGENOUS FLORA




foreign proprietors of intellectual property rights be avoided? To
help think through these issues, it might be useful to draw, albeit
loosely, 240 on John Rawls's essay, The Law of Peoples,241 in which
Rawls applied in the international context the principles articulated in
A Theory of Justice.242  Rawls's methodology suggests that valuing
domestic experimentation should not lead to endorsement of whole-
sale denial of foreigners' rights under domestic intellectual property
regimes.
Behind the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," the things an individual
nation might not know when crafting its intellectual property laws
might include: whether it is a net producer of intellectual property or
a net consumer; whether it has a sizeable innovative community
whose own survival might be jeopardized without strong intellectual
property protection; whether it faces particular challenges, such as a
large segment of the population that suffers from life-threatening
illnesses; whether amongst its legal and social traditions there is
strong support for freedom of expression; whether the nation includes
an indigenous population making special constitutional or other legal
claims relating either to particular substantive norms or the processes
implicated in their development; whether it is already involved in
regional alliances touching on intellectual property rights; and so on.
As has been noted, for many leading observers of and partici-
pants in the international intellectual property lawmaking processes,
the development of standardized, globally applicable intellectual
240. Here, I draw on Rawls's discussion to identify ways that states can interact with one
another in the international regulation and protection of intellectual property rights. Rawls,
however, refers to the "Law of Peoples" throughout his analysis. But see Frank J. Garcia, The
Law of Peoples, 23 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 659, 666 (2001) (book review) (suggesting that Rawls's
distinction between peoples and states "deflects nothing: functionally, they are identical").
241. RAWLS, supra note 36.
242. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1972). For some, this may be to repeat Rawls's
error of privileging states in the international law arena, as opposed to many of the other actors,
such as nongovernmental organizations, who have as much independent validity as states in
international relations. For a stern and compelling critique of Rawls's ideal theory in the
international law context, see Lea Brilmayer, What Use Is John Rawls' Theory of Justice to
Public International Law?, 6 INT'L LEGAL THEORY 36 (2000). Professor Brilmayer points out
that "[tihere is no reason theoretically to start with states as the relevant actors" and that
"[t]here are non-governmental organizations, universities, human rights organizations, churches,
mosques and many other institutions that have just as much independent validity internationally
as states do, from a purely theoretical point of view." Id. at 39. However, within the classic
model of public international intellectual property law, it is states that sign on to public
international law agreements, and, as we have seen, it is in the names of states that claims of
breaches of these agreements are brought. This suggests that in the international intellectual
property context, Rawls's methodology may assist in addressing the question of how much self-
determination is tolerable.
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property law norms is both inexorable and desirable. However, if we
did not know about the domestic circumstances of our state, it is also
possible that variations in national intellectual property laws might
come to be regarded more tolerantly. If State A did not know what
its domestic circumstances were to be, it may be anticipated that State
A would support strong intellectual property rights, as there would be
a reasonable likelihood that amongst State A's population would be
innovative or creative individuals or firms as well as businesses that
would be interested in protecting the goodwill they have established
in trademarks and other badges of origin. State A may also be inter-
ested in attracting foreign investment. 43 At the same time, it is also
possible that State A might be tolerant of domestic law experimenta-
tion by other states, because this may be exactly the kind of leeway
that State A itself might need in order to meet the exigencies created
by its own domestic circumstances.
Adapting Rawls's analysis for the international intellectual prop-
erty context may help us see that valuing domestic self-determination
need not become an elaborate justification for international piracy.
Normative justifications for incorporating the value of domestic self-
determination need to take account of both the exigencies of domes-
tic circumstances and the relationships between individual nations in
the intellectual property context.
Detailed analysis of the ways that valuing the possibilities for
domestic experimentation in intellectual property laws by individual
nations might come to be reflected in international intellectual prop-
erty jurisprudence must await another opportunity. The following
section is proposed to offer only some initial speculations on this
issue, taking into account both the value of domestic self-determina-
tion as well as limits that might be imposed on its scope.
D. The Value of Self-Determination in Forging Public and Private
International Intellectual Property Doctrine
At the public international law level, an appreciation for the
value of domestic self-determination might lead to an approach to the
drafting of international law instruments that allow increased scope
for departure from international norms, including by way of more
243. See generally Doris Estelle Long, First, "Let's Kill All the Intellectual Property
Lawyers!": Musings on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property Empire, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 851, 871-73 (2001).
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expansive exception clauses. In the interpretation of international
law instruments, furthering the value of domestic self-determination
might actually lead to less reticence about identifying policies under-
lying decisions to deviate from international intellectual property
standards. As was noted above, 244 in its decision on section 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act, the WTO panel declined to look behind the
claimed policy objectives of the home style and small business excep-
tions. For all that this approach has been characterized as reflecting a
deferential attitude toward policies developed by individual nations,241
more might actually be achieved by more rigorous scrutiny of the
policy objectives underlying the domestic laws that are accused of
deviating too far from international norms.246 For instance, when
applying the three-part test for scrutinizing exceptions to intellectual
property rights owners' rights, it might be possible to conclude that
the expectations of proprietors of intellectual property rights are not
"reasonable" when they are inconsistent with domestic policies pur-
sued as part of furthering important domestic state agenda. That is,
the expectation that a proprietor of intellectual property rights derive
income from exploitation in a foreign territory, an expectation that
might otherwise be reasonable, may need to give way where denying
the proprietor the ability to exploit the intellectual property right in a
particular instance is necessary in order to achieve a compelling
policy outcome.
To ensure that putative state policies do not disguise misappro-
priation of intellectual property rights, it may actually be appropriate
for adjudicative bodies to engage in rigorous scrutiny of whether the
exception to the intellectual property proprietor's right actually
serves the policy that is posited as the justification. In the US section
110(5) case, for instance, the policy justification put forward by the
US government for the small business exception was that the excep-
tion was necessary to foster small businesses and to prevent abusive
tactics by collective copyright management organizations.247 The
European Communities responded that the exception was too broad,
given the large number of business organizations that might benefit
244. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
245. See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 32.
246. The panel expressly rejected this approach, declining to equate a "certain special case"
with "special purpose." Panel Report, supra note 65, 6.111 (citing other WTO decisions that
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from it.2 48 However, if there were more of a willingness to engage
with the policies that underlie the domestic laws that are the subject
of scrutiny, it might be quite possible to challenge the small business
exception based on the dubiousness of the connection between the
success of small businesses and the ability to turn on a radio without
acquiring a license. As an empirical matter, that connection might be
quite difficult to establish.
To the extent that these suggestions are inconsistent with the
WTO panel's reluctance to engage with the policies posited as the
justification for the deviation from international intellectual property
standards, they must be regarded as both speculative and heterodox.
In the private international law context, however, there may exist
greater scope for the value of domestic experimentation to influence
the development of international intellectual property jurisprudence.
Unlike in public international law, however, policy scrutiny of the
laws under consideration is doctrinally less appropriate, outside of
narrow principles associated, for example, with the doctrine of ordre
public.2 49 One way of giving expression to the value of respect for
divergent policy choices made by different nations in the shaping of
their intellectual property laws is to continue the development of
choice of law principles that encourage courts to ascertain and apply
the laws of foreign territories in which infringements are alleged to
have taken place.
To return to the Bart6k example, suppose that the New Zealand
Symphony Orchestra was not quite so restrained and engaged in a
campaign of international marketing of the recording of the viola
concerto, both within and beyond Australasia. Suppose also that one
of the potential defendants was located in the United States,
prompting Bart6k's heir to initiate proceedings within a US forum.
An approach to choice of law that would respect differences within
domestic legal systems would be to apply the laws of each of the
countries in which compact discs containing the new recording were
marketed. Accordingly, there may be copyright infringement in
countries that provide for a longer copyright term, but no infringe-
ment in countries that provide for a shorter term. Damages could be
calculated, taking into account those differences.
248. Id. 6.116.
249. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 369-73 (discussing public policy exceptions to
traditional choice of law rules).
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In the trademarks context, valuing domestic self-determination
might lead to a more deferential attitude in cases in which plaintiffs
attempt to encourage US courts to apply the Lanham Act to conduct
in foreign territory.2 0 For example, if a foreign country denies
trademark rights to certain categories of words or symbols, it may be
inappropriate for a court in another jurisdiction to apply its own
trademark laws in a manner that, in effect, creates and enforces
trademark rights in words or symbols that fall into that category.
More generally, this approach might prompt a rethinking of the
Lanham Act jurisprudence that treats the degree of conflict with
foreign laws as one factor in the analysis of the propriety of the appli-
cation of the Lanham Act to conduct abroad. Instead of asking
whether it is appropriate to be applying US trademark law to conduct
in foreign territories, it might be more useful to ask why the foreign
trademark law, which regulates the use of signs in commerce within
that territory, should not itself be applied by the US court. Such an
approach brings with it a much greater likelihood that domestic policy
choices regarding the regulation of signs in particular jurisdictions will
have efficacy for the jurisdictions in which they were developed and
where they were intended to have legal force. 51
III. THE DREYFUSS-GINSBURG DRAFT CONVENTION ON
JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATTERS
In its basic structure, the draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters proposed by
250. More conservatively, this approach might encourage courts to give more weight to the
"degree of conflict with foreign law" factor, when analyzing the factors articulated in Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). See also Warnaco Inc. v. VF Corp.,
844 F. Supp. 940, 950, 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). When applying this factor, courts have naturally
been concerned with the legal significance of the defendant's trademark rights in foreign
territories, assessing, for example, whether a pending application by the defendant is likely to
succeed. See, e.g., Les Ballets Trockadero de Monte Carlo, Inc. v. Trevino, 945 F. Supp. 563,
567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The New Zealand Trade Marks Bill raises a different question, viz.,
whether a decision by a domestic legislature that certain categories of words or symbols should
not be the subject of exclusive rights should prompt restraint on the part of foreign fora that are
invited to apply the law of the forum to conduct involving infringement of "rights" in words or
symbols that fall into the precluded categories. Thus, it may not necessarily be appropriate to
conclude that merely because there is no foreign registration, "there is no evidence to support
the proposition that [the foreign nation] has an interest in th[e] litigation that conflicts with
application of the Lanham Act." Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 61 F. Supp. 2d 720, 723
(N.D. Ohio 1999). I am grateful to Professor Dinwoodie for this reference.
251. See generally Bradley, supra note 10.
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Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg' 52 has the potential to support the
value of self-determination in the shaping of domestic nations' intel-
lectual property laws. This is because the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft
avoids, for the most part, all issues of choice of law, acknowledging
concerns expressed by the intellectual property practicing community
that have focused on the fact that choice of law questions implicate
the territorial nature of intellectual property rights. 3
The jurisdiction clauses in the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft identify
variations on the "defendants play home" rule254 where it might be
appropriate that courts other than those of defendants' habitual
residence exercise jurisdiction. In infringement actions, jurisdiction
may be asserted where the defendant substantially acted in the forum
(including preparatory acts),255 or where the forum is in any state to
which the alleged infringement was intentionally directed (including
states for which the defendant took no reasonable step to avoid acting
in or directing activity to that State). 5 6 In addition, any state in which
the alleged infringement foreseeably occurred may assert jurisdiction,
unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in or
directing activity to that state.257
The draft then imposes limitations on these bases for exercising
jurisdiction. For example, where jurisdiction is taken on the ground
that the forum is in a state to which the defendant directed infringing
activity, the forum will have jurisdiction over only those infringe-
ments arising out of unauthorized use in that state, unless the plain-
tiff's habitual residence or place of business is also in the forum
state.258 Likewise, where an action is initiated in the courts of a state
only on the basis that the state is where an infringement occurred, the
forum shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out
of unauthorized use that occurred in that state. 259
252. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35.
253. Id. at 1066.
254. Cf Brussels Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
255. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1077 (art. 6.1.a).
256. Id. (art. 6.1.b).
257. Id. (art. 6.1.c).
258. Id. (art. 6.2) ("If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the basis of the
intentional direction of the alleged infringement to that State, then those courts shall have
jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out of unauthorized use occurring in that State,
unless the injured person has his habitual residence or principal place of business in that
State.").
259. Id. The limitations on jurisdiction are further expanded upon in art. 16, which includes
a number of prohibited grounds for exercising jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is taken "on the
basis solely" of a number of factors, including the nationality of the plaintiff or defendant or the
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft
affords opportunities for quite expansive jurisdiction: either the
defendant's forum or a forum which is both where the plaintiff is
habitually resident and a place to which the defendant directed the
infringing activity might have jurisdiction over all infringements.
Importantly, however, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft treaty does not
dictate that the forum should apply its law to the various infringe-
ments, notwithstanding the importance of the connecting factors that
establish jurisdiction.260 On this issue, the draft-but not the accom-
panying commentary-is silent.
The part of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal that does speak to
choice of law is article 25, which articulates the grounds for refusal of
recognition or enforcement of a judgment. Article 25.1(h) provides
that recognition or enforcement of a judgment can be refused on the
basis that "the rendering court's choice of law was arbitrary or unrea-
sonable," which would include where the rendering court "applied a
law lacking sufficient significant relationship to the dispute. ' 261 A
further sentence in article 25.1(h) states: "The conformity of the
forum to the jurisdictional terms of this Convention does not neces-
sarily, of itself, suffice to establish a significant relationship between
its laws and the dispute. '2 62 The latter sentence would appear to
avoid the implication that application of the forum's law to all in-
fringements will always, or necessarily, be reasonable. This may be
significant: according to the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg draft treaty, before
jurisdiction over infringements that occurred in a number of different
foreign territories may be established, a number of fairly compelling
connecting factors need to be present. In the "intentionally direct-
ing" set of cases, for instance, the forum seized of the dispute may be
both the place of the plaintiff's habitual residence and at least one of
the places to which the defendant's campaign of infringing activities
was directed. As drafted, the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal implies
that the presence even of these factors will not necessarily be suffi-
cient to avoid the risk of nonrecognition or enforcement of a judg-
seizure of tangible property in the forum state. Id. at 1083.
260. Nor does it expressly prohibit it. Subject to the prohibitions articulated in art. 16, the
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal, like the 1999 Hague Draft, provides for jurisdiction to be exercised
according to the law of the forum, subject to the risk that any resulting judgment will not be
enforced elsewhere.




ment rendered following the forum's application of its laws to all
infringements, wherever they occurred.
The position becomes more complex, however, in the commen-
tary Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg provide on the draft treaty.
There, they identify a number of choice of law rules they regard as
"[iun general.., presumptively reasonable. '26 Some of these rules
point toward application of a single governing law, such as when
allegedly infringing content is found on a website: in this case, the
presumptively reasonable choice of law would be the law of the coun-
try in which the operator of the website has its residence or principal
place of business.2 64 If infringement is achieved other than by way of
availability on a website (such as through file sharing) the governing
law will be the law of the country of the person who initiated the
communication. 265 These rules would give way, however, where a
third country is shown to have a "more significant relationship" with
the controversy. Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg suggest that a
country with a more significant relationship would include a third
country that is the "principal target" of the defendant's infringing
communication. 266 In turn, another country may have a "more sig-
nificant relationship" with a controversy, based, most likely, on fur-
ther connecting factors.2 67 However, as an overarching choice of law
principle in cases in which the defendant's activities are directed at a
multiplicity of countries, Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg consider
that it would be presumptively reasonable to apply the laws of each
country to "that portion of the infringement occurring within each
territory.'"268
The latter approach to choice of law can be regarded as consis-
tent with the value of domestic self-determination, to the extent that
it would appear to require courts in some instances to ascertain and
apply the intellectual property laws of foreign jurisdictions. However,
it is difficult to tell how strong the presumption in favor of this choice
of law approach will transpire to be. It seems courts may need to
work quite hard to get there, given that it is a fallback choice of law




267. For example, a forum might be: the place where the plaintiff is habitually resident, one
of the places to which the defendant's infringing activities were directed and the place of the
defendant's habitual residence.
268. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1146.
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principle that operates only after it cannot be established that a single
place was the principal target of the defendant's activities, or that a
particular jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the
dispute. 26 9 The extent to which this choice of law principle leads to
courts actually applying the laws of countries in which infringing
works are consumed without authorization of the proprietor of the
intellectual property rights, rather than some other law such as that of
a possibly quite distant place where the defendant uploaded the work
to a website2 10 may depend on how robustly courts approach attempts
to establish either a "principal target" of the infringement, or,
alternatively, a place with the "most significant relationship" to the
dispute (through analysis of connecting factors). Cases in which
things are evenly balanced, without a gravitational pull toward any
one jurisdiction, may be rare, suggesting only limited opportunities
for application of foreign intellectual property laws by domestic fora.
A further concession to the possibility of domestic variation is
provided for by the statement that, in fashioning remedies, the court
"may take into account the extent to which, for particular countries in
which acts alleged to be infringements occurred, the domestic law is
substantially either more or less protective than the [chosen law].271
This principle might allow a court to disregard infringements in a
territory in which a work is in the public domain for the purposes of
calculating damages, even if the work would be protected according
to the chosen law. If this principle were mandatory, rather than
permissive, it might do more to support the value of domestic self-
determination. 272
269. Id. at 1145-46 ("[I]f the infringing communication was intentionally directed to a
multiplicity of countries, in such a way that the country of initiation lacks a significant
relationship to the dispute, but no single third country can be shown to be the principal target,
or to have the most significant relationship to the dispute, then the laws of each country to
which the communication was intentionally directed are applicable to that portion of the
infringement occurring within each territory.").
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1146.
272. Cf. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309
U.S. 390 (1940), discussed supra, where the court did not determine whether there were
infringements under the law of the place of unauthorized exploitation of the work. Probably as
a result of Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg regarding this as a principle of permissive rather
than a mandatory application, it was not necessary for them to clarify whether a failure to have
regard to the level of protection afforded by the country in which a work is exploited without
authorization would render the approach to choice of law "arbitrary" or "unreasonable." If,
with proper deference to domestic self-determination, courts were required to consider the
different levels of protection afforded by the laws of the countries of exploitation of the work, I
would suggest that a failure to do so would give rise to an inappropriate choice of law, and
would provide a ground for not recognizing or enforcing a judgment so rendered. In addition,
2002]
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In the Internet context, however, the scope for application of this
apparent concession to domestic self-determination might again
transpire to be quite limited, given some of the techniques used to
localize infringements in the forum. In cases such as Primetime 24, it
was accepted that the infringements occurred in the United States,
even though Canadians were the intended audience for the broad-
casts. The principle articulated by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg
might achieve more if courts were encouraged to localize carefully all
the steps in the defendant's infringing activities, recognizing that
different aspects of a campaign of cross-border infringement might be
localized in different territories273 and the possibility that different
national laws might apply to each stage.274  If the issue were ap-
proached in this manner, recognizing that it is the domestic laws of
the foreign jurisdictions that create the markets for the plaintiff's
work, and which therefore should be applied to the infringing acts
that usurp those markets, 275 this principle might do much to further
the value of domestic self-determination in the shaping of interna-
tional intellectual property jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
To scrutinize the proposal by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg
according to whether or not it is supportive of the value of domestic
self-determination is to adopt a criterion that is only peripherally
relevant to their project. While some concern for the territoriality of
intellectual property rights is articulated in their proposal, their pro-
ject appears to be animated more by the policy concerns of achieving
a more efficient approach to transnational disputes,27 6 promoting
consistent outcomes in these disputes, 277 and preserving judicial re-
this clause as currently drafted appears to be limited to "copyright or related rights"; it may be,
however, that this could be some further scope for the principle in other branches of intellectual
property law, where different nations' domestic laws are "substantially either more or less
protective."
273. See, e.g., Psihoyos v. Liberation Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (reproduction
of a copyright work in Austria did not implicate US copyright law, but US copyright law did
apply to distribution of the infringing copies within the United States).
274. The Second Circuit has recognized that different laws might apply to different legal
issues in transnational litigation. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc.,
153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (Russian law applied to issue of copyright ownership, whereas US law
applied to infringing activity within the United States).
275. Cf. Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate
Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 153, 159 (1995).
276. Dreyfuss & Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 1065.
277. Id. at 1066.
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sources.2 8 These policy concerns are of course critically important to
achieving an international intellectual property jurisprudence that can
meet the challenges of globalization and the continued development
of technologies allowing for the international dissemination of works.
The extent to which the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg proposal supports
that value of domestic self-determination is a matter of emphasis.
Parts of the analysis appear to support the idea that choice of law
principles can be developed in a manner that is consistent with the
view that some nations may quite legitimately do some things differ-
ently, including by providing varying levels of protection for intellec-
tual property rights. However, their analysis of the "presumptively
reasonable" choices of law appear to be weighted more in favor of
"single governing law" solutions, solutions that would require deci-
sion makers to engage less with possible divergences between domes-
tic intellectual property law systems.
In the development of international intellectual property juris-
prudence there may, however, be other important values at stake.
One, as I have suggested in this Article, is "intellectual property self-
determination": the need and ability for individual nations to do some
things differently in the intellectual property sphere. Recognizing the
value of domestic self-determination may usefully inform our think-
ing as the processes of forging intellectual property law norms for an
interconnected world continue to emerge and develop.
278. Id.
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